

3. Strategic Guidance

9 DECEMBER 1952

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE DECISION ON M.C. 14/1A REPORT BY THE STANDING GROUP on STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

Note by the Secretary¹.

At the First Meeting of their Seventh Session on 9 December 1952, the North Atlantic Military Committee amended M.C. 14/1 and then approved the recommendation in paragraph 6 of Enclosure "A".

2. Holders of M.C. 14/1 are requested to
 - a. Replace pages 1, 6, 8, 16, 24, 25 and 29 with the enclosed pages 1, 6, 8, 16, 24, 25 and 29 and to destroy the removed pages by burning.
 - b. Remove and destroy by burning, pages 34, 35, 36 and 37. c. Renumber paragraphs 23 et seq. in Part II, Section II, as paragraphs 22 et seq. [These paragraphs have been renumbered in the new pages issued with this Decision.]
3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of M.C. 14/1.

ENCLOSURE "A" REPORT BY THE STANDING GROUP on STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

(...)

1. The first major step in planning the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Area was the approval by the Council on 30 November 1949 of a Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area (reference a). This document, which has recently been amended in minor detail to bring it up to date, is drafted in the broadest terms and is the authority from which all strategic guidance stems.
2. In January 1950 Strategic Guidance to Regional Planning Groups was issued to the five Regional Planning Groups into which the North Atlantic Treaty Area was then divided, and they were directed to develop consequent Defense Plans based on the year 1954.

These Regional Defense Plans, when received, were consolidated by the Standing Group in a document which was subsequently approved by the Council on 1 April 1950 as D.C. 13.

3. Since its issue, D.C. 13 has provided the basis for all NATO strategic planning. With the passage of time and the development of events, however, it became clear that NATO strategic plans needed to be revised.

4. In carrying out this revision full account has been taken, among others, of the following factors:

- a. The need for NATO strategic plans to be based on a date later than 1954. In selecting this date, the maximum period ahead for which a realistic appreciation of the situation can be established has been considered, and 1956 has been chosen as the new datum year. The revised study has therefore been drafted to provide strategic guidance for the major NATO commanders for the period up to 1956 inclusive. It must be stressed, however, that despite its broad treatment, this guidance may well require further revision before 1956 if circumstances change significantly.
- b. The changes in the Intelligence Estimates since D.C. 13 was written two years ago.
- c. The extension of SACEUR's right flank, consequent on the accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO, and of the obligation to defend German territory which will result from the creation of the European Defense Community.

5. The revised paper (Appendix) has been approved by the Standing Group and has been forwarded to major NATO Commanders and the Canada-U. S. Regional Planning Group as provisional Strategic Guidance (pending the approval of the Military Committee) in supersession of D.C. 13 and M.C. 14.

RECOMMENDATION

6. It is recommended that the Military Committee approve the paper at Enclosure and forward it to the Council.

**APPENDIX
NATO
STRATEGIC GUIDANCE**

**PART I - DEFENSE POLICY AND GENERAL CONCEPT OF
OPERATIONS**

I - INFORMATION

1. Throughout this document all information of an intelligence nature and all estimates in connection with potential enemy and neutral powers have been derived from S.G. 176/2, "Intelligence for the Standing Group and Intelligence Guidance for the Major NATO Commands and Commands Associated with NATO." The guidance provided below, which considers the situation should war with the Soviet occur between now and 1956 inclusive, should be read in conjunction with this intelligence study as revised from time to time.

II - DEFENSE POLICY

2. In peacetime the defense policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Nations is to convince the USSR that war does not pay, and to insure a successful defense of the NATO Area should war occur. This policy requires the development and maintenance of an adequate military strength and a close coordination of the political, economic and psychological efforts of member nations. Plans for the implementation of this policy should adhere to the following principles:

- a. To oppose, by all measures short of war, any peacetime attempts by the USSR or her satellites to increase their threat against the Treaty nations; meanwhile, initiating measures to exploit Soviet weaknesses.
- b. To develop the required military force, bearing in mind the economic and manpower situation of each nation, and to achieve and maintain technical superiority in its weapons.
- c. To maintain this force continuously at its maximum efficiency by training and the development of combat techniques, by the modernization of their equipment, and to insure that it is capable of the required expansion in war.
- d. To provide mutual assistance in the provision, and through the standardization of equipment and coordination of production, and through the interchange of planning, intelligence and technical information.

3. In the event of aggression the North Atlantic Treaty Nations will take combined and coordinated action to defend their peoples, territories and war-making capacities against all forms of attack, placing special emphasis on the defense of Europe since its loss might well be fatal to the defense of the North Atlantic Territories as a whole. Concurrently, the North Atlantic Treaty Nations will develop and mobilize their combined strength with the object of achieving the earliest defeat of the USSR and the attainment of allied war objectives, the latter being decided by the Governments of the North Atlantic Treaty Nations.

III - ASSUMPTIONS

Political Alignments

4. Political alignments are assumed to be as follows:
- a. The following will form the Soviet Bloc:

USSR	Albania	Bulgaria
Communist China	Czechoslovakia	East Germany
Hungary	North Korea	Outer Mongolia
Poland	Rumania	Viet Minh Forces
 - b. The Soviet will be in occupation of, or have base rights in:

East Austria	Porkkala (Finland)	Port Arthur (China)
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 - c. The following countries, together with their dependent territories, will form the Western Powers:

NATO:

Belgium	Canada	Denmark
France	Greece	Iceland
Italy	Luxembourg	Norway
Portugal	The Netherlands	Turkey
United Kingdom	United States	

Others:

Australia	Ceylon	Japan
Latin America	New Zealand	South Africa
Nationalist China	West Germany	

d. The Western Powers will have access, at least initially, to the territories and resources of the Allied Occupied Areas, and bases in certain other countries, as follows:

Occupied Areas:

Trieste West Austria

Base Rights:

Egypt Iraq
 Jordan Liberia
 Libya Ryukyus
 Saudi Arabia The Phillipines

- e. Finland will attempt initially to remain neutral. She will not willingly give the USSR any military assistance, and will try to avoid giving permission for Soviet troops to move into Finland. She may be expected to fight if Soviet forces enter Finnish territory without express permission would be dependent on the development before the outbreak of war.
- f. Spain will resist Soviet aggression, but the extent of the initial aid she will afford to the Western Powers will be dependent upon developments before the outbreak of war.
- g. Yugoslavia, even if not herself first attacked, will probably participate in hostilities against the Soviet Bloc in the event of Soviet-Satellite aggression in Europe. If attacked she will fight back vigorously with all of the forces at her command.¹
- h. Sweden, Switzerland and Iran will try to remain neutral unless attacked.
- i. The alignment and attitude of the remaining nations are assumed to be as estimated in S.G. 176/2.

Estimated Enemy Threat

5. The USSR and its satellites comprise a vast land mass power complex. This power complex is not significantly dependent upon sea lines of communication for its economic and military strength. Its military power may be projected into adjacent areas and supported on interior surface lines of communication. The Soviet complex, by virtue of indigenous population and social organization, can provide a manpower pool for military purposes in excess of that which can be provided by the Western Powers. These facts indicate that:

¹The Italian Military Representative is of the opinion that in the event of general war, it is probable that Yugoslavia, if not attacked, would try, initially at least, to remain neutral. If attacked, she will participate in hostilities against the Soviet Block.

- a. The USSR is not significantly vulnerable to sea action;
- b. The enemy would have a preponderant advantage in ground warfare.

6. Appreciating the fact that all NAT nations will be aligned against her on D-Day and that she will be subject to strategic air attack with weapons of mass destruction, the USSR is likely to strike only when convinced that she has the capability both to overrun Western Europe and also greatly reduce the atomic striking power and mobilization potential of the Allies elsewhere. If successful, the USSR will then be virtually invulnerable to land attack and less vulnerable to air attack. To gain this position the USSR and her satellites, while protecting their own territory and coastal waters, are likely to attempt:

- a. The following campaigns, not necessarily in order of priority and possibly simultaneously, to:
 - (1) Overrun Western Europe.
 - (2) Seize key points in or overrun Scandinavia.
 - (3) Neutralize or overrun the U.K.
 - (4) Overrun Southern Europe and selected areas of the Middle East.
 - (5) Disrupt the military potential of North America.
 - (6) Neutralize strategic air bases elsewhere.
- b. In conjunction with the above campaigns, to obtain egress for her fleets from the Baltic and Black Seas, and initiate naval and air action to sever essential Allied sea communications and to establish submarine and mine blockade of important Allied ports.
- c. To initiate subversive activities and sabotage against Allied interests in all parts of the world. In this she can be expected to have the active support, open or clandestine, of Communist Parties throughout the world.

Weapons

7. All types of weapons, without exception, might be used by either side. It has been assessed by sources with knowledge of weapons of mass destruction that, although by the period 1953-54 their effect on the conduct of war will not dictate a need to reduce current NATO force goals, greater availability of such weapons and increased delivery capability during the period 1954-56 may then necessitate re-evaluation of the requirements for a successful defense of the NAT area. However, as the conventional NATO forces at present in being fall far short of requirements, no relaxation can be allowed in their planned expansion until progress in the development of weapons justifies a reassessment, particularly in reserve and build-up forces. This will certainly not change currently established force goals.

Warning period

8. a. There would be an evident advantage in having the maximum time available in order to facilitate the deployment of the Covering forces and the Mobilization. Therefore, every effort should be made in this respect to organize the collection of intelligence on warning.
- b. However, as a worst case it must be assumed that there will be no warning period before hostilities begin.

IV - OVERALL STRATEGIC AIM

9. Should they be drawn into war, the over-all strategic aim of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers, in cooperation with any Middle East defense organization that may be established, is to ensure the defense of the NATO area and to destroy the will and capability of the USSR and her satellites to wage war, initially by means of an air offensive, while at the same time conducting air, ground and sea operations designed to preserve the integrity of the NATO area and other areas essential to the prosecution of the war. In the Far East the strategic policy will be defensive.

10. Operations to achieve this aim will fall into four main phases. These phases, which are unlikely to be distinct and may vary relatively in different areas, are as follows:

- PHASE 1 - D-Day to the stabilization of initial Soviet offensive, to include the initiation of the Allied air offensive.
- PHASE 2 - Stabilization of initial Soviet offensive to the initiation of major offensive operations by the Allies.
- PHASE 3 - Major offensive operations by the Allies.
- PHASE 4 - Final achievement of Allied war objectives. The remainder of this Guidance considers only Phase 1 operations.

V - BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN THE FIRST PHASE

11. To achieve the above over-all strategic aim, the basic NATO undertakings are to:
- a. Arrest and counter as soon as practicable the enemy offensives against the North Atlantic Treaty Powers by all means available, including strategic and tactical air, naval and land forces, appropriately supported by unconventional operations.
 - b. Ensure Allied ability to carry out strategic air attacks promptly, by all means possible and with all types of weapons.
 - c. Secure, maintain and defend such main support areas, air and naval bases and other facilities as are essential to the successful

accomplishment of these basic undertakings, and protect the lines of communication serving them.

- d. Mobilize and expand the over-all power of the NATO nations, in accordance with their planned contribution to later offensive operations.

PART II
STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AREA
SECTION I: THE GENERAL CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENCE
OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AREA
General Concept

12. The general concept for the defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Area in the First Phase requires the Allied military effort to be directed at:

- a. Arresting the Soviet advance, thus protecting and preserving the integrity of Allied territories to the maximum extent feasible and covering their progressive mobilization. As Europe is likely to be the target of the main Soviet advance, and as its possession will be of overriding importance in later phases, special emphasis must be given to its first phase defence. To this end the primary effort must be devoted to delaying and arresting the main enemy thrust while holding and exploiting elsewhere. Since this is so, we ought:
 - (1) To aim at having the maximum forces available at the very outset or at least ready to come into action in the first few weeks if this involves no unacceptable risks in the matter of reserves of equipment, or in delaying the arrival of later formations. The possible impact of this conception on national arrangements for training, equipping and mobilizing their second line formations is obvious.
 - (2) To insure that forces which are to bear the brunt of the initial attack are preponderantly those which have the greatest stopping power.
- b. Concurrently:
 - (1) Initiating the strategic air offensive against the enemy. The indirect effect of this offensive on the defensive battle will be cumulative and may be decisive;
 - (2) Taking such other offensive action against the enemy as is possible.
- c. Preventing or minimizing to the utmost all attempts, by any means and wherever made, to destroy the Allied war potential. Provision must be made for the protection of major centres of Allied populations, production and mobilization, together with their lines of communication, from interference or destruction.

The Conduct of the Defence

General

13. All practicable methods and techniques calculated to distract and delay the enemy, including sabotage and subversive action, should be employed in this phase to gain the maximum time for deployment of sufficient forces to stabilize the enemy offensive.

Land

14. The conduct of the land defence should be aggressive, making full use of local opportunities for offense and maintaining mobility wherever possible, including the exploitation of Allied command of sea flanks. Arrangements should be made to deal with enemy air, guided missile and airborne attacks in areas where these may be anticipated.

Air

15. The general plan for the employment of NATO airforces must be offensive from the outset. Initially this plan should be aimed at achieving air superiority, with a view to allowing a progressively greater part of the Allied Air Forces to support the land, sea and strategic air battles and to protect the lines of communication and key areas. In addition the strategic air offensive will have a direct effect on the battle for air superiority and upon the over-all NATO battle. Control and other arrangements must be combined with the innate flexibility of the air arm to ensure that maximum effectiveness can be obtained with a minimum of forces.

Sea

16. Naval forces should be employed primarily for the protection of sea communications, with their essential ports and bases. This includes the defense of coastal waters and sea/air approaches. Areas from which the enemy might otherwise operate should be sealed off, and he should be denied the use of sea routes necessary to his strategy. The Allied Naval Forces may also be required to give direct support to the Land Forces, and must be ready to carry out raiding operations and large scale air-strikes or amphibious operations in support of the overall strategy.

17. Convoy systems should be established, involving the provision of anti-submarine strike forces and forces to augment escorts in focal areas as well as direct escort for convoys. In addition, a naval control service will be required, to ensure that neutral shipping does not prejudice the Allied defence effort and that contraband does not reach the enemy.

SECTION II: ESTIMATES OF THE SITUATION

General

18. From the strategic point of view the territory covered by the North Atlantic Treaty must be considered in relationship to its geographical setting. This setting comprises Continental Europe (consisting of Western Europe, flanked by Scandinavia and Southern Europe), the British Isles and North America. The defence of these also involves their contiguous sea areas, and in particular the North Atlantic, the English Channel and North Sea, and the Mediterranean. In addition, the detached NATO territories of Continental Portugal and Algeria require separate consideration.

19. The concept for the defence of each of these areas must take into account its relative strategic importance within the North Atlantic Treaty defence complex and also the strategic factors which influence its defence. These are considered below for each area, in the order given in paragraph 18 which best presents their mutual strategic relationship for the purpose of this study.

Western Europe

Strategic Importance of Western Europe

20. Because of its concentration of peoples, the material resources it commands, its high industrial potential and the strategic value of its central geographical position, the conquest of Western Europe by the enemy would represent a major victory. The strategic advantages for the further conduct of the war which the enemy would gain by its subjection would be almost decisive.

21. Conversely, the retention of Western Europe by the Atlantic Treaty Powers preserves for them invaluable facilities in the way of ports, communications, airfields and skilled manpower for offensive operations against the enemy. Its possession, therefore is of overriding importance, and its defence will cost less than its reconquest.

Strategic Factors

22. The following factors arise from the above and other considerations:
- a. The importance of Western Europe is such that it will be the enemy's primary objective in the war. It is estimated that he is likely to launch his main land and air attack against it and its communications. This attack is likely to include a heavy air offensive, both conventional and atomic, and possible airborne operations.
 - b. As much as possible of Western Europe must be retained. This is necessary not only to protect its territories from invasion, to preserve its maximum potential for the Allies and to give depth to its ground and air defense, but also to facilitate the defense of Scandinavia, the British Isles and Southern Europe, to deny the enemy access to the North Sea ports, and to enable counter-offensive operations envisaged by the North Atlantic Treaty strategy to be developed.
 - c. Western Europe is largely dependent for its existence on overseas resources, on the sea communications carrying them and on the ports handling them.
23. In addition, the following topographical factors influence the defense of Western Europe:
- a. The only major natural obstacles to the passage of land forces into Western Europe from territory at present in Soviet hands are the River Elbe, for approximately its last 150 miles, and the River Rhine-Yssel (the latter improved by artificial means) from Switzerland to Ysselmeer. Between these two rivers there are a number of lesser rivers and other minor obstacles which could be used for delaying an enemy advance.
 - b. The terrain most suitable for defence east of the Rhine is provided by the hilly country of central West Germany and by the Black Forest, the latter covered to the south by Switzerland.
 - c. The North German Plain, flanked by the North Sea, offers the easiest terrain for a major Russian offensive into Western Europe.

Strategic Concept and Objectives

25. The concept for the defence of Western Europe is to hold the enemy as far to the east in Germany as is feasible, using all offensive and defensive means available to deny or limit his freedom of action to the maximum extent.

26. Operations to fulfil this concept should be based on the provision of an adequate *couverture* force, and should be planned with special regard to:

- a. Retention of the industrial potential of Western Germany, the Benelux area and Northeastern France.
- b. Protection of major ports, air bases and communications centres, against air and airborne attacks.
- c. Denial to the enemy of the use of the Kiel Canal and of bases on the North Sea Coast.

27. The most efficient offensive means likely to be available at the outbreak of the war for the achievement of this concept is the employment of airpower, both Tactical and Strategic. Air power is capable, by vigorous attack on the enemy's air and ground forces, lines of communication and rear areas, of slowing down and contributing materially to the halting of his offensive.

28. The land battle should aim at delaying and weakening the enemy's advance with a view to holding him as far to the east of the Rhine as possible, in consistency with the forward strategy set forth in paragraph 25 above. Operations should be developed along defensive-offensive lines, exploiting situations which will absorb maximum enemy capabilities and progressively blunt his offensive.

29. Whenever the operations mentioned in paragraphs 25-28 cannot be properly carried out, the over-all strategy should include an effort to hold selected key areas as long as possible.

Scandinavia

Strategic Importance of Scandinavia

30. The strategic importance of Scandinavia lies principally in the peninsulas and islands which dominate the passage from the Baltic to the North Sea. If the enemy could occupy or neutralize these, and thus open the exits from the Baltic, he could greatly increase his attacks against vital Allied sea communications in the North Sea and Atlantic. He would also obtain forward airfields from which to attack Allied strategic bases, particularly those in the United Kingdom. In addition he would make his sea lines of communication in the Baltic far more secure, and also greatly strengthen the air defence of his own territory and bases by establishing a forward air-warning organisation. Conversely, the value of Scandinavia to the Allies lies in the strategic cover its possession affords, and the possibilities it offers for counter-offensive naval and air operations.

31. Sweden, by reason of her economic, industrial and military strength as well as her strategic location, could play a most important part in the defence of Scandinavia. However, she is not a member of NATO and is likely to remain neutral unless attacked. 32. Norway, with the United Kingdom, commands the North Sea and the Northeastern approach routes to the North Atlantic Ocean. She is also an important source or terminal for certain materials of strategic significance, notably iron, timber and wood-pulp.

33. Denmark is a key to operations in the Baltic and dominates its exit. She also forms a bridge over which the main Soviet effort is likely to be directed in an attack against Sweden and Norway. Strategic Factors

34. The following factors arise from the above and other considerations:

- a. The enemy is likely to afford high priority to operations against Norway and Denmark designed to give him, and deny to the Allies, the Baltic-North Sea passage, particularly as this would also extend his air-warning cover in a vital direction. Further, he is likely to be attracted by the possibility of operations across Lapland, with a view to denying to the Allies the northern Norwegian ports and their strategic cargoes and establishing bases there from which his air and White Sea naval forces could harass Allied communications in the North Atlantic.
- b. The defence of Norway and Denmark must take account of Sweden, which lies in the path of any attack against Scandinavia from the east, particularly as Russia cannot ignore the possibility of Sweden joining the Allies should another Scandinavian country be attacked. Except for the difficult land approach through Finland in the extreme north an attack against Sweden must take the form of a sea and, possibly, airborne assault. Land based air cover can be provided most effectively in the south. In the interior communications are very limited, and operations through Sweden directed against Norway would initially be restricted largely to routes leading toward Oslo and Trondheim in the south and the Narvik area in the north, the latter possible including a small amphibious operation.
- c. As it is estimated that the main Russian threat is in any case most likely, on account both of topography and the need for effective air-cover, to be made from the south through Jutland and Zealand, the defence of Denmark is the key to the defence of Scandinavia. A further consideration is that successful defence here is, by its location, more likely than anywhere else in Scandinavia to draw off appreciable forces from the main Russian drive into Western Europe.
- d. Plans for the defence of Scandinavia are likely to be greatly affected by those for operations in the North Atlantic and Western Europe. As contact with the Western European forces operating in Northern Germany is unlikely to be maintained, the defence in this area must be

planned to meet this contingency. On the other hand, the Scandinavian forces may be afforded considerable support by naval striking forces operating in the North Atlantic.

- e. The forces maintained by Denmark and Norway in peacetime are small. Furthermore, the topography is such that it is difficult to transfer units and formations rapidly from one part of the country to another, particularly where sea crossings are involved. It is therefore vital that these countries should receive maximum possible warning of impending attack, to enable them to increase their preparedness as far as possible. However, it must be expected that the Soviet attack will aim at surprise, and forces should therefore be deployed initially with this in view but at the same time be capable of redeployment in order to concentrate against the most dangerous threats, and thus avoid defeat in detail.

Strategic Concept and Objectives

35. In the light of the above considerations it is clear that Scandinavia must be defended as a whole, though operations in the isolated Narvik area may well develop quite separately from the battle for Southern Scandinavia. Plans for the defence of Norway and Denmark, and also of Sweden should this be possible, must therefore be integrated. These plans should be based on the need for the utmost flexibility, to permit concentration to deal with surprise attacks before they can be reinforced. Maximum use should be made of available naval and air forces, both local and supporting, in defensive-offensive roles.

36. Particular emphasis must be placed on the defence of Jutland and Zealand and on the retention of those areas in Norway and Denmark, and in Sweden should she join the Allies, from which the Allies can undertake operations to:

- a. Control the exit from the Baltic.
- b. Deny to the enemy forward bases in Northern Norway from which to operate his air and White Sea naval forces against Allied communications.
- c. Counter Soviet naval and air operations and harass his communications in and over the Baltic. The Danish island of Bornholm provides a valuable outpost for this purpose, but it will be difficult to sustain its defence.
- d. Afford support for land and sea based offensive strikes against enemy territory.
- e. Cooperate in the control of the North Sea and Eastern Atlantic.

SOUTHERN EUROPE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF SOUTHERN EUROPE

37. The strategic importance of Southern Europe in a war against the U.S.S.R. arises from the following considerations:
- a. Its Alpine flank covers the southern end of the Western European defenses.
 - b. It forms a barrier between the Russian forces and the Mediterranean.
 - c. It dominates the Black Sea exit and bars or flanks any direct Soviet advance to the Middle East. It provides in Turkey valuable staging and other facilities for strategic air missions against Russia.
 - d. It includes:
 - (1) Yugoslavia, the only "lapsed satellite", which, though not a member of NATO, is likely to join in a defensive war against the Soviet Bloc and thus afford the Allies considerable psychological advantage as well as some military aid.
 - (2) Albania, the only isolated, and a comparatively weak, member of the Soviet Bloc.

Strategic Factors

38. Southern Europe is divided into three major land compartments: the Italian Peninsula, the Balkans and Turkey. Throughout almost the whole area the terrain is mountainous. It is suitable for large scale land operations and the deployment of mechanized formations only in the Northern Italian Plain, in Thrace and on the Anatolian Plateau. 39. Italy has no frontier with enemy territory, and a land attack against her is only likely through Austria or Yugoslavia into the Northern Italian Plain. In the North this plain is covered by the wide and easily-defended Italian Alps, but to the East the defense of Italy is prejudiced by the fact that the Julian Alps, with their strategic gaps lie beyond the Yugoslavia border. Therefore, though the Isonzo River offers a secondary defense line in Italian territory, the course of events in Northern Yugoslavia will greatly affect the defense of Northern Italy.

40. The coastal zone of the Northern Aegean Sea links Greece and Turkey, covers their flanks, and provides access to the Mediterranean. However, this zone in the Grecian Thrace is dominated by the mountains of Southern Bulgaria, is very attenuated and lacks depth for effective defense.

41. The enemy effort in the Balkans is likely to be directed first at the Danube Valley of Yugoslavia. It is estimated that the Soviet and Satellite forces involved will then be directed through Northwestern Yugoslavia towards Italy and through Southern Yugoslavia towards Greece in an attempt to secure bases on the shores of the Mediterranean from which Allied sea

communications could be seriously threatened. The latter drive would probably be coordinated with forces attacking Greece directly from Bulgaria. Though Yugoslavia is unlikely to be able to hold her Northern Plains she may be expected to withdraw effective forces into the mountains.

42. The enemy will devote considerable effort to the conquest of Turkey, thus depriving the Allies of their dominating positions on the Black Sea, athwart the direct approaches to the Middle East, and of the air bases and other facilities which Turkey provides. The possession or neutralisation of Turkey would give the enemy access to the Mediterranean and greater freedom of operation against the Middle East. In particular it would threaten important Allied oil producing areas, as well as extending the enemy's air warning cover and the range of his air operation.

43. It is estimated that simultaneous enemy attacks on Turkey will consist of:

- a. A thrust from the Caucasus along the Lenianakan-Kars-Erzurum axis directed on the key road and rail junctions in the Sivas-Kangal area.
- b. The main attack from the West into Turkish Thrace with the object of making an assault crossing of the straits and a drive into Anatolia.

In addition a further threat to the Sivas-Kangal area, in the form of seaborne operations across the Black Sea against Samsun, must also be expected. The danger of possible envelopment by enemy forces moving through Persian Azerbaijan and turning westwards across Northern Iraq and Syria towards Iskanderun must also be considered.

43. In addition to their role in their defense of the Northern Turkish coast the Turkish naval forces and particularly their submarines, may be able to contribute materially to Allied offensive operations in the Black Sea in the first phase.

Strategic Concept and Objectives

44. The defense of Southern Europe therefore involves:

- a. The defense of Italy, buttressed on the Northwest against the Swiss Alps, and holding the Italian Alps and at least the Isonzo Line.
- b. The defense of Greece as far to the North and East as possible, with consideration being given to defending at least on the Strouma River line and to moving the defense line forward when practicable.
- c. The defense of Turkey as far to the North and West as possible, provided the defense of Anatolia and the denial to the enemy of the passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, which are considered of overriding importance, are not thereby jeopardized, with every effort being made to retain as much of Thrace in allied hands as possible, and with consideration being given to defending at least of the Catalca-

Demirkapi fortified positions, and moving the defense lines forward when practicable.

- d. The establishment of an adequate defensive system in Northeast Turkey and the provision of a force to cover the focal Sivas-Kangal area in the center, particularly against an amphibious attack from the North.

45. The effectiveness of the strategy adopted by the Yugoslav forces, the degree of co-operation achieved with them and, if this is satisfactory, the support they can be afforded will have marked effect on the situation both on the Italian and Greek fronts. In particular, it will materially assist the Allies if the Yugoslavs can, even if only with light forces, hold or harass the enemy directed on the Julian Gap, maintain a significant force between Albania and Bulgaria and block the Vardar Valley to the South. By this means appreciable enemy forces will be drawn off and the depth of the Allied position will be increased.

46. Countermeasures to prevent the envelopment of Turkey will require to be co-ordinated with Allied arrangements for the defense of the Middle East, which they will in turn serve to support. Similarly, the co-operation of Iran and Iraq in denying the Azerbaijan and Kurdistan passes to the enemy is obviously very desirable. 47. Full advantage must be taken of the special opportunities which exist in Southern Europe for conducting an aggressive defense, with particular regard to:

- a. Southern Europe's position on the left flank of the enemy's thrust into Western Europe.
- b. The location of the Northern Italian Alpine Redoubt overlooking any enemy advance into Austria.
- c. The flexibility conferred on the Allies by their sea communications behind Southern Europe, particularly in the Northern Aegean.
- d. The holding of as much as possible of the broad territorial zone of the Southern Balkans and Anatolia which can be used as an operational base for offensive operations in the future.
- e. The advantages, including psychological, which might accrue if Yugoslavia stages effective resistance and maintains in being forces adequate to neutralize or draw off significant enemy strength.
- f. The dependence Russia is likely to place on Satellite troops in operations in the South.
- g. The relative vulnerability of Albania.
- h. The existence of an important mass of Greek-Turkish forces on the spot offering the possibility for carrying out an aggressive defense.

49. Plans to fulfill this general concept in Southern Europe should also include measures to:

- a. Provide Allied and cobelligerent ground forces, including guerillas, with appropriate naval and air support.
- b. Foster and exploit Yugoslav resistance against the enemy.
- c. Counter any turning operations the enemy may try to initiate by seaborne landings in the Black Sea.
- d. Insure co-ordination with operations designed to defend adjoining areas.
- e. Co-ordinate the withdrawal of forces in Austria should this be necessary.
- f. Insure co-ordination with naval and air operations in the Mediterranean, including the support of strategic air operations routed over the area.
- g. Deny the enemy naval forces exit from the Black Sea, and harass them there.
- h. Operate light naval forces in support of the defense of the Turkish mainland.

The British Isles

Strategic Importance of the British Isles

50. The British Isles, by virtue of their geographical location, their industrial capacity and their ports and airfields, provide both a support area for NATO and a forward base for the defence of Europe and its sea approaches. These factors make them of vital importance to the defence of Europe. In view of this, and of the importance the enemy is likely to place on denying the British Isles to the Allies as a base for strategic air attacks, he is likely to launch a heavy air offensive, both conventional and atomic, against them in the early stages of the war. He may also be expected to attempt to cut them off from their overseas sources of supply by attacking their sea communications by submarine operations and mining, and possibly to stage airborne and seaborne raids in some strength against key targets in the British Isles themselves.

Strategic Concept and Objectives

51. The defence of the British Isles has as its basic requirements an effective air defence organization and the protection of its sea communications. In addition, ground forces will be required in sufficient strength to deal with enemy airborne and seaborne raids. 52. In conjunction with its close defence, effective protection of the war capacity of the British Isles also involves an air

offensive against enemy air, submarine and minelaying bases within range, which will in turn contribute to the general Allied offensive-defensive effort in Scandinavia and Western Europe.

North America

Strategic Importance of North America

53. The importance of North America in a war with the USSR lies in the fact that it is the NATO area least liable to large-scale ground or sea attack, possesses the principal Allied production and offensive capacity and is geographically well placed to provide several of the bases required to control vital lines of communication between Europe and the support areas. In addition it provides the main base for the strategic air offensive.

54. Its importance is therefore such that, though it is a difficult target, the enemy is likely to make a major effort to disrupt the North American military potential and its mobilization. Strategic Concept and Objectives

55. The concept for defence of the Canada-United States Region is founded on the principle that, in case of war, the Allied war objectives can be gained only by the employment of the main Allied war effort offensively against the enemy. In order to make available the maximum force for offensive employment, the CUS Region will devote to defensive purposes only that portion of their total force which is necessary to provide a reasonable degree of protection for the essential elements of North American war-making capacity.

56. In accordance with this concept, the first call on the forces considered necessary to provide the minimum acceptable degree of protection of North America must be allotted to the defence of its productive capacity, communications, bases, mobilization and training facilities. The United States and Canada have stated that the risks involved in not providing specifically for defence against forms and scales of attack unlikely to detract materially from the region's war-making capacity are acceptable. However, in 1956 the Soviet Union may have a formidable atomic potential against North America, and an adequate defence for this area thus becomes essential in order to permit NATO to accomplish its military objectives.

The North Atlantic Ocean

Strategic Importance of the North Atlantic Ocean

57. The North Atlantic Ocean is the medium whereby the great potential of the Americas can be transported and brought to bear against the enemy in Europe. The security of sea routes within this ocean area is a vital requirement. Further, by the operation of Allied task forces in these waters, powerful blows can be struck at enemy potential.

Strategic Factors

58. Unlike the USSR, which is largely self-contained and self-supporting, the NATO powers rely to a great extent on the free use of world-wide lines of communication. The enemy may therefore be expected to take any opportunity to disrupt these.

59. At the outbreak of war Russia will have no bases bordering the North Atlantic except in the extreme north, nor will her bases in the Baltic threaten it providing Denmark is held. However, light forces from the Baltic may be able to enter the North Atlantic by way of the Baltic-White Sea Canal during the summer months. All the islands in the North Atlantic belong to NATO powers or those likely to be allied, and all can be fortified and developed in peace with the exception of Spitzbergen, which is governed by the terms of the Treaty of 1920.

59. The strategic concept governing employment of forces operating in the North Atlantic Ocean is to establish and maintain control of the area and its sea and air lines of communication, to defend the NATO and Allied home territories and essential base areas in and bordering it, and to employ available maritime forces both offensively and defensively in support of the over-all strategy.

60. Plans for operations in the North Atlantic should include provision as necessary for the following specific requirements:

- a. Seaward defence of the archipelagos of the Azores, Madeira and Bermuda.
- b. Defence of Greenland, Iceland, the Azores and Bermuda.
- c. Defence of the Faroes, Spitzbergen and Jan Mayen, which otherwise might be exploited by the enemy to the significant disadvantages of the Allies.
- d. Support of operations in Scandinavia.

The English Channel and North Sea

Strategic Importance of the English Channel and North Sea.

61. The protection of the Allied Sea and air lines of communication in and over the English Channel and North Sea, and the denial of their seaways and airspace to the enemy, are of vital importance to the successful defence of Western Europe and the British Isles.

Strategic Factors

63. All the territories bordering the English Channel and North Sea, including Western Germany (with Heligoland), are within the NATO/ EDC area. At the beginning of the war the enemy will, therefore, have no naval or air bases in territories bordering these waters, and enemy submarines or surface craft can only enter by way of the North Sea or the Atlantic Ocean. The ports and harbours, however, are within range of aircraft from existing Soviet bases.

64. In view of the strategic potential of the United Kingdom and its value as a base for the Allied air offensive, large-scale enemy air attacks are likely to be routed over the English Channel and North Sea from the beginning of the war.

Strategic Concept and Objectives

65. The concept for these waters is therefore to establish and maintain maritime and air control of them with a view to the defence of the Allied bases and lines of communication that border them, in support of the overall strategy.

The Mediterranean Sea

Strategic Importance of the Mediterranean

66. The Mediterranean Sea skirts the Allied territories in Western Europe, Southern Europe and Turkey, and on its control depends the security of direct Allied sea and air lines of communication with these territories and with North Africa, the Middle East and beyond. 67. The Mediterranean Sea also affords great opportunity for exploiting the flexibility of the naval arm in support of the land battle, both by amphibious operations and by the employment of naval striking forces, which can launch large-scale air strikes against enemy operations in Europe and Asia Minor from the outbreak of hostilities.

Strategic Factors

68. Of the territories bordering the Mediterranean only Albania is likely to be hostile to the Allies. Except possibly in Albania, therefore, the enemy will initially have no naval or air bases on the Mediterranean coast, and apart from any submarines already deployed in the area enemy naval vessels will have to penetrate the narrow entrances from the Atlantic or the Black Sea. The enemy air threat over the Mediterranean, however, is likely to be considerable, particularly in the narrow waters off Southern Europe.

69. The islands and southern shores of the Mediterranean provide a number of suitable sites in Allied or friendly hands which are geographically well placed to provide bases both for the strategic air offensive and for the protection of Allied air and sea lines of communication.

Strategic Concept and Objectives

70. The strategic concept governing the employment of forces in the Mediterranean Sea is therefore to control its waters, to defend the litoral of the NATO and friendly territories it borders (including the islands of Crete, Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia) and to employ available forces, both offensively and defensively, in support of the overall strategy in Southern Europe and Turkey.

71. Plans for operations in the Mediterranean should include provision for the following specific requirements:

- a. Control of the exits from the Atlantic and the Black Sea.
- b. Defence of bases in Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Northwest Africa, Libya and Egypt supporting the strategic air offensive or serving vital Allied lines of communication.
- c. Support of Allied operations against the enemy in territories bordering, or maintained through, the Mediterranean. This may include the employment of striking forces to carry out air or amphibious counter-offensives.

Portugal

Strategic Importance of Portugal

72. Though part of Continental Europe, Portugal's relatively protected location in the west of the Iberian Peninsula, covered by Western Europe and behind the Pyrenees barrier, confers on it the role of a support area for the main land battle. In addition it provides valuable bases for the defence of the Atlantic.

Strategic Factors

73. Within the NATO concept for the overall defence of Europe, enemy action against Portugal is likely initially to be limited to strategic air attacks against selected objectives. The intensity of these attacks is likely to depend considerably on the role adopted by Spain and the extent to which the Iberian ports and communications are used to support and sustain the Allied effort in Europe.

Strategic Concept and Objectives

74. The concept for the defence of Continental Portugal in this Phase is therefore to provide, with a minimum of forces and in close cooperation with defence arrangements in the Eastern Atlantic, and adequate degree of protection against enemy air attack for its ports, airfields, and land communications, and for its approaching sea communications.

Algeria

Strategic Importance of Algeria

75. The importance of Algeria within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization lies in the following facts:

- a. It is an integral part of the economy of Metropolitan France.
- b. It provides, with the other territories of Northwest Africa:
 - (1) An important NATO support area.
 - (2) A base area for the Allied strategic air offensive, and for naval and air operations in the Mediterranean.

Strategic Factors

76. In view of its geographical situation, enemy action against Algeria is likely to be limited to strategic air attacks against its bases and main centres of communications.

Strategic Concept and Objectives

77. The defence of Algeria must be planned as part of the defence of the Northwest African support area. It will require the provision, in cooperation with defence arrangements for Europe and the Mediterranean, of a reasonable degree of protection against the enemy air attack likely to be directed on the NATO and Allied bases and facilities in Northwest Africa and on their approaching sea communications.
