

**1. Summary Record of the First Session of the NAC  
15 September 1950  
Excerpts**

**NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL FIFTH SESSION NEW YORK,  
SEPTEMBER 1950(...)**

**IV. Item 4: Questions Affecting the Defence of western Europe**

14. D. Stikker drew attention to a report of August 18, 1950, which had been forwarded by the Western European Regional Planning Group to the Standing Group of the Military Committee recommending Withdrawal to Rhine-Yssel defence line in the event of aggression in Western Europe. A decision to defend this line would necessitate the evacuation of two and a half million inhabitants from the northern provinces of the Netherlands and of a further million residing east of this line. This withdrawal would also involve evacuations from Germany. In his view a plan to defend this small area, swollen with refugees, was completely unrealistic. The effect on the morale in the Netherlands would be disastrous if such a plan were adopted and when high morale was indispensable for a successful defence. In his view it was essential to establish a defence line as far to the east as possible. This would necessitate more divisions and more equipment than were now available. To provide these there appeared to be two alternatives:

- (1) the transfer to Western Europe of divisions from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada or
- (2) German participation in the defence of the West. He felt that, inasmuch as the Defence Ministers would discuss this report when they meet next month, they should have guidance from the Council on the major political issues involved.

15. Mr. Bevin recalled that the plan in question had been based on estimates of the military and financial resources available at the time it was drawn up. Recent changes, such as the lengthening of military service in Great Britain and the decision of the President of the United States to increase the size of the United States forces in Germany, would doubtless lead to a reconsideration of strategic plans. He emphasized that it was far better to use the maximum strength of the West to avoid being overrun, rather than be faced with the problem of liberating conquered territory.

16. M. Schuman supported the views expressed by D. Stikker. From the time of signing the North Atlantic Treaty, France had been in favour of an effective defence of the West, which would prevent the catastrophe of occupation.

The NAT countries were fully conscious of the gap in their combined defences and it was this knowledge which had led to the adoption of the recent measures to increase their efficiency. These measures, however, were still in the planning stage and until the defence programmes were implemented the West would continue to face a serious threat. He expressed his pleasure at the decision of the President of the United States to send increased forces to Germany, but he had reservations regarding the arming of Germany. Other considerations apart he doubted whether the rearming of Germany would, in effect, result in increasing the total resources available for defence. This equipment would have to be drawn from existing resources available to the NAT countries. To raise and equip German at the expense of the forces of the NAT countries would be unacceptable.

*(corr. 15.9.52)*

17. The Chairman said that in his view it was not a question of a choice between the two alternatives mentioned by the Representative of the Netherlands. In order to defend the West effectively both solutions would have to be adopted: Troops would have to be sent to Germany from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, and steps must be taken simultaneously to rearm Germany. He felt that there were two ways of going about the drawing up of strategic plans: either the Council could inform the Defence Committee that a certain quantity of manpower and equipment was available, leaving the military experts to decide how large an area could be defended; or it could inform the Defence Committee that, for political reasons, a given area must be defended in the latter case it would be up to the Council to obtain the necessary men and equipment to meet the requirements for such defence as calculated by the military experts.

(...)

#### **16 SEPTEMBER 1950**

#### **Summary Record of the Second Meeting, held in New York on 15 September 1950 at 3 p.m.**

#### **I. Questions Affecting the Defence of Western Europe (Item 4)**

The Council resumed their discussion on questions affecting the defence of Western Europe.

2. There was unanimous agreement on the proposal, which had been put forward by Dr. Stikker at the previous meeting, that the defence line should be drawn as far as possible to the East, i.e., somewhere in Germany.

3. Discussion then turned on the question on what reply should be given to Dr. Adenauer on his offer to participate actively in the defence of Western Europe.

The discussion showed that, whereas the majority of the Council had no objection in principle to the participation of Western Germany in the defence of the North Atlantic area in some form or another, there were divergent views on the precise form which this participation should take, the degree of risk which should be run and the timing and presentation of the decision. Various arguments for and against the use of German manpower and resources in the defence of the North Atlantic area were advanced which can be summarized as follows:

#### **For**

- (1) In view of the decision to draw the defence line as far as possible to the East, it, was logical that Western Germany should participate actively in the defence not only of their own territory but also of the North Atlantic area as a whole.
- (2) The utilization in one form or another of German manpower would go some way towards the solution of the problem of finding a sufficient number of divisions to meet the full defence requirements of the area.
- (3) From the political standpoint, there was a golden opportunity at the present time of securing the permanent allegiance of Western Germany to the North Atlantic powers. If this opportunity was not taken, it was unlikely to recur and there was a serious danger that the will to resist in Germany would progressively deteriorate.

#### **Against**

- (1) The natural fear, inherent in Western Europe, of a resurgence of German militarism.
- (2) The danger that a proposal to rearm Germany would not be supported by the peoples of the NAT countries particularly those countries which had been occupied during the late war.
- (3) The fact that a considerable proportion of the Western German people themselves had openly expressed their unwillingness to see the rebirth of a German army.
- (4) The danger of being forced by the general pressure of events into taking a hasty decision in favour of German rearmament which might well in the long run have disastrous consequences.
- (5) The danger that the rearmament of Germany might be regarded as a provocative act and precipitate an act of aggression.

4. COUNT SPORZA said that when the military experts decided on a withdrawal to the Rhine-Ijssel they committed the fundamental error of neglecting the human element.

Thus they failed to take into consideration the danger of the immediate panic which might ensue with the consequential inflow of refugees over the borders of France and Italy.

He was, therefore, strongly in favour of fixing the defence line as far to the east as possible. Such a step would have the added advantage of preventing the encirclement of Yugoslavia which country should be encouraged to associate itself with the NAT powers. In his view the war of tomorrow would be a war of ideologies akin to the religious wars of the middle ages. The existence of Yugoslavia as a center of a heresy which might well spread to other countries within the Soviet orbit would be of incalculable value to the North Atlantic countries.

5. In his view the fate of Western Germany at present hung in the balance. While appreciating the fears of those countries which had been overrun by Germany during the war, he felt that the present offered an excellent opportunity of winning over the Western Germans to the side of the free countries. This opportunity would not present itself again and for this reason it would be fatal to adopt the suggestion made by some of his colleagues that the decision on this point should be deferred for more mature consideration.. This was a historic occasion and he hoped that the Council would be equal to it.

6. MR. BEVIN underlined the fundamental delicacy of the position. It was essential to secure the support of the peoples as a whole for such a radical step. In his view the active participation of Germany in the defence of the North Atlantic area should not be put forward in isolation as an individual project, but should be submitted as a part of a general plan for a fully integrated defence of Western Europe, which is to be implemented with all possible speed. As part of the proposals for an integrated defence force the Council ought to reach an early agreement on setting up some kind of unified command.. This preliminary work should precede the actual German participation. It was generally realized that the country in any future war would be able to delay its full scale preparations until war had actually broken out. All the work of building up of the Allied Forces which took place in the period 1939-1942 would have to be done in advance. The countries of Europe had however become used to the idea of being organised for purposes of defence, but if Governments took far reaching powers over the people individuals were entitled to expect in return that the Governments would operate efficiently.

7. As far as the Germans themselves were concerned, while it was true that the approach had been initiated by Dr. Adenauer, it should be made clear to Western Germans that they must accept the principle of resistance to aggression from whatever quarter it might come.

There appeared to be no insuperable difficulty in working out a carefully conceived formula which could be presented to the Western German Government.

8. In particular the North Atlantic countries must avoid putting themselves in position of approaching the Western Germans as a suppliant. The British Government was not prepared to accept the view that, if the Germans were not associated with the North Atlantic Treaty countries these countries were incapable of defending themselves. Every possible sacrifice would have to be made rather than to make an admission of that kind. In brief the British Government was prepared to accept Dr. Adenauer's approach at its face value and take immediate steps to work out the necessary conditions in conjunction with the Western German authorities. It would, however, be necessary to give precedence to the building up of the North Atlantic Treaty forces first and then include in this integrated defence force whatever German forces were forthcoming, so as to ensure that, they were used properly and effectively.

9. As a separate issue, he would like to emphasise the importance of strengthening the existing police force in Western Germany. At present the West German police were neither strong enough nor well enough organised or trained to be a really effective force. He saw no reason why immediate steps should not be taken to improve this situation and suggested that the High Commissioners should be instructed to work out appropriate plans immediately.

10. MR. ACHESON said that the discussion showed so far that there was a wide area of agreement and a considerable area of uncertainty. In an attempt to clarify some of the uncertainties it might be helpful if certain basic factors were emphasised. It was agreed the morale and the will of the population was the foundation stone of system of security and defence. It followed from this that unless the population was convinced that the defence plans had some hope of success, the will to resist would be fatally weakened. For this reason the first line of defence must clearly be in Germany as far to the East as possible. If this is done the German will to resist became a major element in the defence of the West, as it was inconceivable that the forces of the other NAT countries would be prepared to fight surrounded by an apathetic German population. On the purely material side the effect of surrendering Germany would be most serious in terms of the loss of resources and production capacity which such a surrender would entail.

11. At the meeting of the Council held in May, Mr. Bovin and Mr. Schuman had both made important statements affecting morale, in which they had stressed the need to forge a defence and not to plan a campaign of liberation.

The United States Government had been much impressed by these statements and a careful consideration of their implications had led to a complete revolution in United States policy.

The first fruits of this new policy were contained in the recent announcement by President Truman of the decision substantially to increase the number of United States forces stationed in Europe and the agreement to raise, identify and commit further reinforcements, which would be sent to the European theatre as and when necessary. The effect of this decision was that if an act of aggression took place in Europe the United States Government would be immediately involved on the same footing as the European North Atlantic Treaty powers. This action by the United States Government, however, did not solve the problem, and the Council must look to the next step. In the view of the United States Government it was necessary to adopt a bolder solution, namely the formation of a large integrated force consisting of identified units contributed by the individual Governments. Those forces would be increased as additional manpower and equipment became available. Clearly the United States Government did not wish to make a contribution to a hopelessly small total force, but to a force which was adequate for the task which it had to perform. It seemed logical that this integrated force must be controlled by some central military organization which would take the form of a central military staff and would administer, train and control the forces. This staff would have to have some individual in charge of it whatever his title or nationality might be. Under this concept, therefore, there would be one integrated staff, directing one integrated force, under the command of one commander.

12. An integrated force on the lines set out above would, of course, require considerable quantities of modern equipment in a very short time. Military production in the United States was being expanded to its limit, but the United States Government were willing to proceed a stage further by participating, if the other countries so desired, in a complete reorganisation of the Military Production and Supply Board, so that instead of having a more planning organisation for production there would exist an executive body which would be of the greatest assistance and help to the various Governments in utilizing every possible element of European production, and in ensuring that the products go immediately to a useful destination.

13. On the financial side an agreement had been reached on measures to be taken to implement the High Priority Production Programme, but more permanent measures would be required if the long term production programme were to be implemented. The United States Government hoped that practical and immediate steps would permit the immediate implementation of large scale production programmes and would be prepared to make every effort to reduce the formalities to the minimum, The

basic approach would be that the United States would cooperate in assisting countries to take action which they would be precluded from taking by the lack of internal or external financial resources.

14. The problem of German participation should be considered in the light of the above general concept. It was a matter of major importance that the Council should arrive at a positive decision on whether or not they wished to take advantage of Dr. Adenauer's offer to participate in the defence of Western Europe both with German manpower and German resources. The precise conditions under which this participation would take place were at this stage of secondary importance. The Council was faced with the straight issue whether or not their plan for the defence of the North Atlantic area did or did not necessitate the participation of Germany. The United States Government was in favour of bringing about German participation in a proper way and at a proper time.

15. It might be of some assistance to the Council to indicate in more detail precisely what the United States Government's intentions were as regards to the participation of Germany. They were not in favour of the formation of a German national army directed by a German general staff and equipped in all respects from German resources. Such a concept would be highly dangerous. The United States Government envisaged that, at the proper time, German units would be raised by the German Government who would be responsible for their pay and uniform. These units, when raised, would be incorporated in the integrated force, planned for the defence of Western Europe. The units should be kept small and incorporated into larger units provided by other countries. War-like equipment would be supplied from outside sources and should be of such a nature that it would be of little use outside the combined force. In brief, a situation was envisaged under which German units would become a part of the integrated force in their own right and not as mercenaries. They would have their own unit officers and there would be no bar against German officers of exceptional ability being posted to the proposed command Organisation. With regard to timing, the United States Government felt that it would take anything up to two years before any effective German combat forces could be placed in the field. Apart from the need to train recruits, machinery would have to be set up to secure these recruits and to administer them. He had not been impressed by the argument put forward that such German units, if raised could only be equipped at the expense of other countries. If, as was hoped, military production available for the North Atlantic Treaty countries was to be increased to a great extent, sufficient equipment would become available for issue to the German units by the time they had been trained.

16. The United States Government did not dissent from the view that the form of presentation was of the utmost importance if the the full support of the democratic peoples was to be assured.

On the other hand they did not believe that decision to permit the participation of German units would be regarded by the Russians as a provocative act which might invite them to commit an immediate act of aggression. The provocative act in Russian eyes was the strengthening of the defence forces of the North Atlantic Treaty area, irrespective of whether or not they came from Germany.

(...)

**17 SEPTEMBER 1950**  
**Summary Record of the Third Meeting,**  
**September 16, 1950 at 10:30 a.m.(...)**

**I. Questions Affecting the Defence of Western Europe**

1. The Council resumed their discussion of questions affecting the defense of Western Europe. They had before them a memorandum by the United States Secretary of State (Document C5-D/6) containing the United States proposals for the establishment of an integrated force for the defense of freedom in Europe.

2. M. SCHUMAN said that the problem before the Council was whether or not the government of Western Germany should be asked to raise, supply, and command troops, which might total several divisions, under the control of a European general staff which might also contain some high ranking German representatives. There were a number of objections to the adoption of a proposal of this kind at this stage:

- (1) Despite the approach by Dr. Adenauer, it was by no means certain that public opinion in Western Germany would support such a step. His attention had been drawn to an article which had recently appeared in the official party organ of Dr. Adenauer's party which took the line that such participation would be premature.
- (2) In whatever way the approach to Dr. Adenauer might be dressed up for diplomatic purposes, any such approach would be interpreted by the people of Western Germany as a request emanating from the North Atlantic Treaty countries.
- (3) There was some doubt from the purely legal point of view whether the right existed under the Treaty to incorporate Western German units in an integrated North Atlantic Defence force if Western Germany was not a party to the treaty. Even if it were legal, it was extremely doubtful whether the Western German government would accept for long anything less than full membership rights.

- (4) On the psychological side, public and parliamentary opinion must be prepared for such a radical step. Although the feeling of intense resentment against the German people had considerably diminished in France, the method of presentation of the proposal to the French people would have to be studied with extreme care, and any premature announcement might well have serious effects.
- (5) Account must also be taken of the probable repercussions in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe. Any announcement that German units were to participate in the defence of the West might well have the result of strengthening the ties between these nations and the Soviet Union, which had of recent times shown signs of weakening, particularly as it was likely that political refugees from these countries would be the first to join the new Western German units. Thus, while the North Atlantic Treaty countries must face the risk of provoking aggression by the Soviet Union by their action in rearming themselves, there seemed little advantage to be gained by creating an additional and to his mind unnecessary, risk at this time.
- (6) While the French Government would not wish to throw doubt upon the good faith of Dr. Adenauer and his colleagues, it should not be forgotten that there were men of good will under the Weimar Government but this did not prevent the subsequent rise of Hitlerism. While it was clearly desirable to bring Germany back into the family of free nations, it was doubtful, therefore, whether rearmament was the best method.
- (7) The danger of a resurgent militarism in Germany should not be neglected. Although the German taste for military adventures might not be apparent at the present time, it was extremely doubtful, whether the military spirit was dead. Furthermore, any measure for rearming Germany would undoubtedly encourage such a spirit, besides having the effect of making the Western German government less conciliatory.

3. In view of these formidable objections referred to above, the French Government, while not irrevocably opposed to ultimate German participation in some form or another, felt that certain conditions must be fulfilled before such participation were authorized. In the first place, as German units were to be incorporated in the integrated defence force, it was axiomatic that this defence force should be in being, whereas at the present time it existed only on paper. As there was no intention of permitting Germany to rebuild their armaments industry, any warlike equipment for these German units would have to come from the common pool of resources available to the North Atlantic Treaty countries. Under present plans it was unlikely that full scale production would begin to flow from the factories much under three years, and yet the creation of German units was to take place in two years.

This later period itself was probably over-generous, as in his view it would be possible to recruit and train the, German units in far shorter time than that. Thus there was a danger of pressure developing to form German units at the expense of the equipment of the other North Atlantic Treaty countries.

In any cases the French Government wished to take the elementary precaution of raising the strength of their own forces to a minimum level before agreeing to the raising of any German units.

4. The French Government, however, did not wish to take a purely negative attitude and they would be prepared to consider favourably alternative suggestions for the use of German manpower and resources. For example, the West German police, if properly trained and organized would be capable of relieving the burden of the occupation forces by taking over the responsibility for the maintenance of internal security. On the material side, a contribution could be made by the Western German government through its heavy industry, particularly steel and chemicals. Labour units could be formed which would be usefully employed on the building of fortifications on the North Atlantic Treaty defence line in Germany, a task at which they had shown themselves to be particularly adept.

To sum up the French Government was still leaving the door open. While not opposed in principle to the suggestions which had been put forward for the participation of Western Germany in the common defence effort, it believed sincerely that such a step was premature and that the announcement of such a decision at this time would do no more harm than good.

5. In the subsequent discussion there was general recognition of the seriousness of the situation and of the desirability of German participation in the common defence of Europe. It was pointed out that the menace facing Western Europe was in fact a threat to all Christian civilization and that therefore the Council must immediately make a basic decision on the question of German participation. MR. STIKKER stated that in spite of the atrocities inflicted by Germany on the Netherlands, some 80 percent of the Dutch Parliament would probably accept the proposals made the day before by the United States.

6. M. VAN ZEELAND said that the discussion had revealed a broad area of agreement, not only on the need for doing all that could be done at present, but on the desirability of taking certain specific steps forthwith, such as economic measures, the strengthening of the West German police, and the initiation of a study of other measures designed to bring about German participation in Western defense.

The United States memorandum contained concrete proposals which could be used as a starting point besides setting at rest certain doubts which had been raised; e.g., on the priority of armament for the North Atlantic countries.

7. Summarizing the morning's discussion, MR.ACHESON said that it was self-evident that all of the countries present at the table were committed to the defense of Europe. What was needed was a "sense of direction" for this effort. Recalling the dictum of General Marshall "Don't fight the problem, solve it," Mr. Acheson urged the Council not to become overwhelmed by the difficulties of this question which were both numerous and great, but to arrive at decisions which would provide the sense of direction so badly needed in the face of the Soviet menace to Europe. The Council should agree in principle to add Western Germans to their own strength now, leaving the detailed arrangements to be worked out by the appropriate bodies. (...)

#### 19 SEPTEMBER 1950

Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting, held in New York, 18 September 1950 at 10.30 a.m.(...)

#### IV. Questions affecting the Defence of Western Europe: (Item 4 on the Agenda, for the Session)

6. At the request of the Chairman, Mr. SPOFFORD reported the results of the meeting of the Council Deputies held on the 17th September, 1950. He said that the Deputies were of the opinion that an exchange of views on the general principles underlying the United States proposals for a Unified Force would be helpful and the Deputies had had a discussion of those matters at their meeting, The discussion was quite extensive and he thought proved most useful. The two phases of the problem, namely the structure of the Unified Force and the German problem were considered and in this respect the Deputies came to the conclusion that in some cases further consideration and consultation with Governments would be required.

7. The Council Deputies had asked him to recommend on their behalf that the Council recess for a short period, possibly for a week or ten days, to enable such consultation with Governments to take place. He added that in the opinion of the Council Deputies it would be useful if the Council at this meeting were to continue its discussion of Item 4 on the Agenda so that each Minister could express his views on the two phases of the problem, particularly with regard to the first phase, namely the establishment of a Unified Force.

8. Mr. SPOFFORD also reported that in accordance with the Council's request the Council Deputies had prepared a draft press communique for their consideration, which would announce that the Council would recess for a short time.

9. The Council decided to recess subject to recall by the Chairman, on the understanding that it was hoped to call a further meeting within the next two weeks.

10. The Council decided to continue discussion of Item 4 of the Agenda for the session.

11. Mr. VAN ZEELAND stated that Belgium was willing to accept wholeheartedly the principle of an Integrated Unified Force and that such a Force should be under a unified commander and that the supreme commander should be assisted by an International combined staff. He thought that the Force should be strong enough and sufficiently developed to resist any aggression and be given the most modern equipment. He expressed the opinion that the maximum effort should be made in order to cooperate in the production of such material. It followed that there were certain financial and economic problems which would be created by the building up of such a Force but hoped that the solution to these problems would be found.

12. He noted with satisfaction that all Member Countries of the Organisation will participate in the building up of the Forces and the decision of the United States Government to carry a full share of the constitution of such a Force by sending additional troops to Europe. He pointed out that for Belgium as for many other countries this question raised many problems, questions bearing on its interior policy and problems of a juridical nature. These questions he thought might also involve constitutional problems.

13. Mr. PEARSON stated that in so far as the question of German participation was concerned there was little he wished to add to what he had already said on the matter. Although it was the general wish of the Council that a decision should be taken at this time on the broad principle of the association in some form, of Germany with our collective defence efforts, he understood the difficulties which have made it necessary to postpone any final views, until the council resumed its session in a few days. He said that he was in agreement with the proposals for the establishment of an Integrated Force for the defence of Western Europe. He thought that this would result in a very useful reorganisation and simplification of the present rather cumbersome machinery under the Treaty, which in his-opinion was desirable.

The closest liaison between the Standing Group, the Defence Committee, and the Council was essential particularly because only France, the United Kingdom and the United States are represented on the Standing Group. He also wished to propose to the Council that consideration be given to the idea of simplifying the whole Council structure by doing away or at least considering doing away with other Ministerial Committees and form one North Atlantic Ministerial Council on which could be represented any Ministers of the participating Governments who may be concerned with questions which come before that Council. He realized that this suggestion had important implications and the Council would not wish to consider the question at this session.

14. Mr. DE KAUFFMAN said that he had listened with great interest to statements and thoughts expressed by Ministers. He said that the Council would understand that the position of Denmark and Norway in this matter were in most ways very similar. He had agreed with Mr. Lange earlier in the day that since the latter intended to ask several specific questions relating to the proposals he would delay expressing his views on the questions of the Integrated Force and German participation until after Mr. Lange had spoken.

15. Mr. SCHUMAN said that he hoped that even on the problem of German participation the attitude of his Government would not be purely a negative one. He trusted that further study of the questions involved would enable all countries to arrive at agreement. He recalled that at the meeting on the 16th September he had said that the French Government was in favour of measures being adopted by which Germany could cooperate in the common defence. He wished to suggest to the Council one way in which Germany could help would be for German manpower to be used to build land fortifications and defence works in Germany on the line to be defended in the East. He thought that the Allied High Commissioners might be asked by the Council to study this suggestion. He reminded the Council that at the present time there was considerable unemployment in Germany and if this idea could be developed and an announcement made in the next few days that it was the intention to use German manpower in this way, it would produce a favourable effect in Germany,

16. Mr. Schuman concluded by saying that he did not wish to add anything to the statement he made on the 16th September on his Government's attitude to the questions which the United States proposal involves.

17. Mr. BENEDIKTSSON said that as his country has no military forces his country was not directly concerned with the proposal to establish an integrated Force with German participation.

He agreed, however, that the idea of establishing an integrated force was a good one and added that the decision of the Council to recess was useful and would he was sure, permit the Ministers to clear with their Governments the many questions raised.

18. Count SFORZA said that his Government entirely agreed with the principle of an Integrated Force under a Supreme Commander assisted by a Combined General Staff and hoped that the Defence Committee would be asked to study the implications of the proposal.

He agreed that there was an urgent need for ensuring closer and fuller cooperation between the Standing Group and those countries, members of NATO, not represented on that Group. He wished to be associated with the remarks of Mr. Schuman with regard to the proposal to employ German manpower for the building of defence works.,

19. Mr. BECH expressed his general agreement with the proposal to set up an Integrated Force on the lines suggested in the United States memorandum. He pointed out, however, that there were several political and constitutional problems affecting his Government's position which would require further study. He stated that he was not in a position at that time to give a definite view of his Government on the question of German participation in the defence of Western Europe, but expressed appreciation to members of the Council for the points which had been raised during discussion which had cleared many of the doubts which had existed in his mind when the proposals were first considered.

20. Mr. STIKKER said that he did not wish to add anything to the statement which he had made at the meeting on the 16th September with regard to German participation in the defence of Europe, but with regard to the question of Integrated Force he wished to state that his Government agreed in principle with the proposal. He agreed that an executive authority on an international level would be necessary and that consequently the NAT nations would have to surrender a certain part of their sovereignty. He said that the Netherlands were willing to make this sacrifice, but wanted to be assured that each participating country would be advised with regard to all developments and that each would have full opportunity to expressing views.

21. He also wished to make a reference to the membership of the Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group which he said it was his understanding there would only be four members, in which the Netherlands were not included. Since the Netherlands have a large Merchant Service and a Navy his Government. attached great importance to being given the opportunity of taking part in the work of that planning group.

22. Mr. LANGE said that he wished to put three specific questions with regard to the United States proposal (Document C5-D/6). The questions which Mr. Lange put were as follows:-

- (1). MR. LANGE referred to the third paragraph of the Document (C5-D/6) in which it is stated that 'the Integrated Force in Europe must be adequate to ensure the adequate defence of Western Europe, including Western Germany". He asked what was meant by Western Europe and which areas were covered by this?
- (2) Regarding the training of forces allocated to the Integrated Force, he asked whether the supreme authority would decide on such matters as the period of training and the system of training the troops allocated by each Member Country to the Force.
- (3) He asked whether it was possible at this stage to say as to how the creation of the Integrated Force was likely to affect the present Regional Planning Group? Would it supersede them, all of them, completely or not? He added that he wanted to know what would happen to the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group. He asked this question because Norway is a member of the North European Planning Group which it would seem might be superseded completely.

23. The Council adjourned until 3:00 p.m.

**18 SEPTEMBER 1950**  
**Summary Record of the Sixth Meeting, held in New York on 18 September 1950 at 3.00 p.m.(...)**

**I. Questions Affecting the Defence of Western Europe.**

1. The Council resumed their consideration of questions affecting the defence of Western Europe,

2. Mr. LANGE said that he had been greatly impressed by the arguments put forward in the favour of an integrated defence force and fully realized the importance of the decision of the United States Government to increase their forces in Europe. He felt sure that the Norwegian Government would not wish to oppose in principle the establishment of such an integrated force but unfortunately he had had no opportunity of consulting his Government on matters affecting the participation of Norwegian units in this integrated force. The Norwegian Government had had no prior warning that such far reaching proposals would be placed before the Council at this session as they had understood that prior consideration would be given to them by the Defence

Committee in accordance with the decision reached by the Deputies. For this reason he was unable to commit himself finally to supporting the proposal. Apart from the specific points which he had raised at the previous meeting, certain constitutional difficulties would have to be faced if Norwegian forces were to be placed under the proposed Supreme Commander of the integrated defence force. He would also like some guidance to what extent, in the eyes of the United States Government, the participation of German units was an integral part of the proposed scheme. He did not draw attention to these difficulties in an obstructive spirit and hoped, after consultation with his Government, that it would be possible for him to give a final answer after the agreed recess.

3. Mr. ACHESON gave the following answers to the specific points raised by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs,

- (1) The term "Western Europe" meant the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty. It was impossible to form a categorical answer on how this area was to be defended as this depended to a considerable extent on the resources available.
- (2) It was not the intention that the Supreme Commander should have any say on the length of military service in each country. It would however, be open to him to lay down certain minimum standards with regard to the troops which were to come under his command. He would also be permitted to refuse the offer of forces which did not reach the minimum standards. In addition the Supreme Commander would inevitably have a considerable say in the method of training and the location of troops which were under his commands.
- (3) The North Atlantic Ocean Planning Group was not in his view directly affected by the establishment of the integrated defence force in Europe. This Planning Group was concerned mainly with maritime matters. It would, however, be desirable for the Supreme Commander to have an effective liaison with the Planning Group, although it was the intention of the latter to retain its existing identity. As far as the other regional planning groups were concerned no clear answer could be given until provisional advice had been obtained from the appropriate military agencies of NATO. Logically, however, it would seem likely that the Supreme Commander and the proposed combined general staff would have to absorb the responsibility for planning at present vested in the existing regional planning groups. Any such changes in the existing organization, including the liaison arrangements between the Standing Group and those countries not represented on it, would, he assumed, be subject to the approval of the Council.

- (4) With regard to the relationship between the proposed integrated force and the participation of German units the United States Government intended that their proposal, as set forth in C5-D/6, should be treated as an integer. For this reason he hoped that the Council would discuss all aspects of this proposal which were inter-related and not leave any specific item on one side.

4. Mr. DE KAUFFMANN thanked Mr. Acheson for the above answers which were most helpful. Denmark was faced with very similar problems to those of Norway. In addition, the geographical position of Denmark, due north of the inter-zone dividing line, was of particular importance. He had not yet had the opportunity of consulting his Government on the details of the proposals and was not therefore in a position to commit himself definitely to the establishment of an integrated force. He hoped, however, that in the light of the additional explanation on various points which he had received. It would be possible for his Government to reach a definite decision during the recess.

5. Dr. CUNHA recognized the great importance of the United States offer to increase the size of their forces stationed in Europe. The Portuguese Government had for some time been seriously concerned about the defence of Western Europe and in fact had been the first Government to draw special attention to the need for an exhaustive study of the problem,

6. In order to assist his Government in reaching a decision on the complicated issues involved, he would like to have some further explanation on a number of points.

- (a) Which countries will be expected to make a contribution to the integrated force?
- (b) Who will decide where the component units of the integrated force will be stationed in peacetime?
- (c) What would be the precise role of the MPSB as an "action body" and what freedom would be left to individual countries on economic matters?
- (d) What would be the relationship between the Supreme Commander and the North Atlantic Ocean Planning Board?

7. In general, the attitude of the Portuguese Government was similar to that of the Norwegian Government, in that his Government had not had an opportunity of examining the proposals in detail, as they were not aware that they were to be submitted to Council during this session. The proposals themselves clearly involved difficult questions relating to national sovereignty and other difficulties of a constitutional nature. Unfortunately the Portuguese Parliament was in recess and was not due to reassemble until November.

Furthermore account must be taken of the defence needs of Portugal's overseas 'territories. He was, however, in a position to state that he saw no objection in principle to the establishment of an integrated defence force, but would have to make a formal reservation regarding the participation of Portuguese national units. He was also prepared to accept in principle the participation of Western German units in the force. His Government regretted, however, that no provision had been made for the global defence of the Iberian Peninsula owing to the continued exclusion of Spain. With regard to the Supreme Commander and his staff there were a number of points which required clarification. He would also like the opportunity of studying detailed proposals for reorganisation of the Military Production and Supply Board.

8. Mr. ACHESON gave the following replies to the questions raised by Dr. Cunha.

- (a) In principle it was hoped that all countries would contribute contingents, but the decision rested with the national governments concerned.
- (b) The supreme Commander would have to obtain the consent of the countries concerned before stationing forces of other nations in their territory,
- (c) The function of the reorganised Military Production and Supply Board would, in general terms, be to give guidance, assistance and help to the member countries.
- (d) There must be a close liaison between the Supreme Commander and the North Atlantic Ocean Planning Group, the precise details of which would have to be worked out.

9. Mr. BEVIN said that he had already indicated the British Government's position but for the sake of the record he would like to state it formally as follows:

- (1) The British Government agreed on the need for an integrated defence force.
- (2) The British Government agreed that this integrated force should be under a Supreme Commander with an integrated staff. Details such as the organisation of the force and the composition of the staff should be worked out by the Defence Committee.
- (3) The British Government accepted in principle the participation of German units subject to certain agreed conditions. It would take time to work out these conditions and for this reason it would not be possible to start the formation of German units immediately, The Defence Committee, however, should be asked to work out the agreed conditions as a matter of urgency and negotiations with the Western German Government should be undertaken as soon as possible.

With regard to procedure the British Government considered that Dr. Adenauer should be informed, in reply to his offer, that the Allied High Commissioners in Germany had been authorized to obtain from him concrete suggestions on the form the Western German contribution might take. This contribution might include the use of production capacity in Germany for the benefit of the NATO forces. The object of this proposal was to obtain from Dr. Adenauer a clear statement of his Government's position.

10. The British Government had not reached the above decision without some misgivings. Serious political considerations were involved but they had decided to face them,

11. Mr. SCHUMAN submitted a draft resolution., inviting the three occupying powers to instruct their High Commissioners to submit an urgent report on the desirability of employing German manpower for the construction. of defence works in Germany, After discussion it was decided to submit this proposal to the Tripartite Conference.,

12. The Council took note of the statements made by the individual Ministers and the explanatory statements made by the Chairman.  
(..)

---