

7. North Atlantic Council meetings on Non- Proliferation 1964/1965 Excerpts

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7. On 16th July, the Soviet Delegation had attacked the proposed NATO multilateral force; they had repeated their well-known arguments and asked for their note of 11th July to be circulated to the Conference.

The United States Representative had replied that the MLF was designed as a partial deterrent to the gigantic Soviet nuclear force which threatened large Western towns.

He had said that the MLF was compatible with non-dissemination and the other Western Delegations had spoken on the same lines.

8. On 23rd July, the subject of non-dissemination had been on the Agenda.

The United Kingdom, the United States and Indian Representatives had expressed the desire for their Governments to reach an agreement on non-dissemination and had said that the MLF was compatible with the Irish resolution. Mr. Tsarapkin had replied at length that it was incompatible with non-dissemination and that no agreement on dissemination could be reached until the West had renounced the idea. He had reviewed the situation of individual NATO countries regarding the MLF, saying that not all were in favour, and that only some had agreed to participate. After reviewing the policy of each member country he had concluded that only the United States and Germany had actually decided that such a force should be created. The United States Representative in reply had said that Mr. Tsarapkin had misrepresented the situation; he repeated that the idea of an MLF was compatible with non-dissemination and condemned Soviet rigidity on this subject. The Italian Delegation had said that the Soviet attitude constituted an unacceptable interference with Italian internal policy. The MLF was a matter for decision by Parliament and was not in contradiction with non-dissemination. The Mexican Representative had spoken ambiguously, without laying the blame on either side, to the effect that the only obstacle to the agreement on non-dissemination was the Soviet opposition to the MLF. He had warned that if a MLF was set up on one side, one might later be set up on the other side.

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11. The **BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE** asked three questions. Firstly, referring to the more forthcoming attitude of Mr. Zorin followed by the hardening of position shown by Mr. Tsarapkin, he asked whether Mr. Cavalletti thought that there were two tendencies in Soviet thinking, or whether individual leaders were allowed a certain freedom to manoeuvre. Secondly, he asked whether the Soviet hardening of position on non-dissemination appeared to be tactical or whether Western renunciation of the MFL was an essential condition for agreement on non-dissemination. Was there a possibility that sound arguments might lead the Soviets to change their views? Thirdly, he asked whether any conversations had yet taken place on the United States reply, discussed in outline in the Council, to Mr. Zorin's suggestion regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops.

12. Mr. **CAVALLETTI**, replying to the first question, said that there were certainly not two Soviet policies, but that there were two Soviet Representatives to be taken into account. He thought that Mr. Zorin had wanted to leave all doors open in order to show that he was not entirely intransigent. He had always spoken in ambiguous terms, sometimes insisting on the difficulties of agreement, sometimes the reverse. He thought that Soviet policy was always to sound out the adversary to see what were the possibilities of the agreement. Secondly, the Soviet tactics regarding non-dissemination had been similar. At the outset, they had indicated possibilities of agreement only to harden their position thereafter when it appeared that there were no Western concessions. At one stage they might have wondered whether it was not in fact in their interests to sign an agreement on non-dissemination, since this might give them the right to have their views consulted in the preparation of treaties on the subject of the MLF. After weighing, the advantages and disadvantages, it appeared that they now preferred to take a more rigid attitude against the MLF. Thirdly, he had been informed that the United States Delegation had not so far replied to Mr. Zorin's proposals but that the Western powers in Geneva would be kept informed if a reply was envisaged.
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14. The **GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE**, commenting on recent inaccurate reports in The press regarding a statement by the United Kingdom Parliamentarian, Mr. Dennis Healey, said that what Mr. Healey had actually said was that a leading German politician had stated that if the United Kingdom and France continued with their independent nuclear deterrent, the pressure on German public opinion to have a German nuclear deterrent would become irresistible in five years' time. The statement quoted had thus not been made by a representative of the Federal Government, nor was it a statement that the Federal Republic would have atomic weapons in five years' time.

Summary record of a meeting of the Council, held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, XVIe, on Monday, 26th July, 1965 at 11 a.m. and 3,30 p.m.

(...)

13. There was no indication of any willingness of the Soviet Union to accept the repeated statements of the United States that proposals for sharing nuclear policy decisions within NATO did not constitute proliferation or nuclear weapons and that some agreement would be to the mutual interest of both sides.

(...)

18. The most important problem confronting nations at the Conference was the urgent need to prevent the increasing dissemination of nuclear weapons, which, if it continued, would have serious implications not only for Europe but also for the whole world.

The United Kingdom realised the need to table as soon as possible a draft non-dissemination treaty which would have the support of the Western Allies and hold the possibility of being accepted by the Soviet Bloc and by the non-aligned countries.

In this respect, he wished to dispel the impression created by distorted Press reports that the United Kingdom Government had decided to table such a treaty without full consultation with its Allies.

He regarded the present meeting of the Council as an important stage in this process of consultation and hoped that other nations would express their opinions on the United Kingdom draft treaty, since these would be taken into account in further discussions, and that the draft could then be tabled in Geneva after its general lines had been approved by the Allies.

19. The basic concept underlying the United Kingdom draft treaty was that a very short and simple form of treaty would have a greater chance of rapid acceptance and that the inclusion of various incentives would not only complicate it, but also make it vulnerable to attack.

Moreover, he emphasised the relationship between the draft treaty and the important question of Arrangements governing nuclear control within NATO. Recognising that the effectiveness of arrangements for collective defence depended on the satisfying of the aspirations for security and equality of all members of the Alliance and implied full interdependence, within NATO, the United Kingdom Government had drawn up proposals for an Allied Nuclear Force with the dual purpose of increasing the cohesion and Effectiveness of the Alliance and of preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons within the Alliance. He emphasised that such proposals were in no way incompatible with the United Kingdom draft treaty on the

non-dissimination of nuclear weapons, but rather that the signing of such a treaty by all the most important countries on both sides would allow progress to be made in planning for effective nuclear control within the Alliance. In conclusion, he reiterated the urgent need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and expressed the hope that other countries would be able to give general approval to the substance of the United Kingdom draft treaty.

20. General BURNS (Canada) said he would confine his remarks to the Canadian draft non-dissemination treaty which had been circulated to the Council together with the United Kingdom draft treaty. Having distributed a comparison of the two drafts which had been prepared by Canada, he said that he agreed with both preceding speakers that non-dissemination would be the most urgent and important subject to be discussed at Geneva, since it had for some time been given high priority by both sides during disarmament negotiations and since several delegations had suggested in previous discussions at Geneva that the tabling of a draft treaty would ensure better progress on this subject.

21. With this in mind, Canada had elaborated an initial draft treaty which introduced several provisions that were not included in the draft treaty drawn up by the United Kingdom.

Following discussions with the United Kingdom, it had been deemed preferable not to seek to achieve an agreed United Kingdom-Canadian draft for presentation to the NATO Allies, but rather to submit both drafts for their detailed comments.

Canada regarded its draft as a working paper aimed at stimulating discussion on the points of principle involved and at obtaining the views of other countries as to the best approach, and Canada recognised the relationship between the issues involved in a non-proliferation agreement and the matters currently under consideration by the Council in respect of nuclear defence problems.

The need to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons had become more urgent on account of the Chinese nuclear tests and some non-nuclear states had recently shown their reluctance to enter into a non-proliferation agreement unless progress were achieved in other disarmament measures. It was hoped that when the Council had considered the principles involved, it would be possible for a single Western text to be elaborated in detail by the representatives of the NATO nations participating at Geneva. (...)

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(ii) it should leave the door open to possibilities for multilateral co-operation within NATO and as necessary in Europe;

(...)

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(i) the use of the wording “association of states” was equivocal and could be misinterpreted; it might infer that the Western Allies were abandoning nuclear co-operation within NATO and Europe;

(...)

36. The advantage of the Canadian text was therefore that it left open every possibility for nuclear co-operation either in NATO or in Europe; it contained clauses to safeguard the implementation of the treaty, and it partly met the demands of the non-aligned countries he had mentioned.

(...)

42. He agreed that probably the most important subject on the Agenda at Geneva would be non-dissemination. Before commenting on this subject, he noted that Mr. Cavaletti had referred to the Yugoslav Resolution recommending a disarmament conference to be attended by all countries of the world. The Twentieth Session of the General Assembly would probably discuss this as a top priority. Since it had not been possible to reach a common NATO attitude on this subject, his Authorities thought that it would be useful to discuss the subject in the Council and possibly in the Committee of Political Advisers, each country stating its rationale as regards such a conference. The Committee of Political Advisers might also discuss whether it might recommend that any such conference should study firstly the joint United States-USSR declaration drawn up by Mr. McCloy and Mr. Zorin in September 1961 in New York, and secondly the question of a formula inviting countries to attend.

43. Turning to the subject of non-dissemination, he said that this Government had instructed him to outline its general attitude in the following way. The Federal Government had always regarded the dissemination of nuclear weapons as harmful and had been guided in this respect by the consideration that the probability of nuclear weapons being used would increase with the number of fingers on the trigger. Germany had therefore always been prepared, and continued to be prepared, to support all efforts likely to prevent effectively the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. Germany had in 1954 announced the production of atomic, biological and chemical weapons on its territory and had to that extent submitted to international control, and his Authorities felt that the further spread of nuclear weapons would be considerably limited if other countries followed the German example. Unfortunately, this had not been done, and the number of nuclear powers had increased.

The fact that Communist China had recently carried out nuclear tests and was consequently regarded by most countries as a nuclear power had considerably impaired prospects for the successful conclusion of a non-dissemination treaty. It was, moreover, highly unlikely that Indonesia, which had left the United Nations, could still be induced to accede to a non-dissemination agreement. Countries which decided nevertheless to sign such a treaty would therefore have to weigh very carefully the risks which this involved for their defence.

44. The Canadian Minister of External Affairs had on 18th June quite rightly emphasised in his statement to the External Affairs Committee of the Canadian House of Commons that it was really the non-nuclear powers which were being asked to give up something for the future and that, therefore, an important role had to be accorded to them in the formulation and negotiation agreement. In the course of recent discussions in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, it had been that many non-nuclear states would not agree to renounce manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons until their security against nuclear threat or attack was guaranteed and until the nuclear powers contemplated restrictions in their nuclear capacities.
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46. With respect to the other argument put forward in the discussions of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, namely the need for guarantees against nuclear threat, blackmail and aggression, the non-nuclear powers would have to insist on some form of guarantee in exchange for the unilateral renunciation expected of them. The Federal German Government thought that this problem was closely linked with an intra Alliance solution of the nuclear problem and was anxious that prior to the negotiation and signature of an agreement with the Soviet Union on non-dissemination, the nuclear problem should be solved within the Alliance, in order that the non-nuclear states prepared to do so could effectively participate in the responsibility for nuclear defence. This view should not be interpreted to mean that Germany desired to possess nuclear weapons if no solution of the nuclear defence problem were found within the Alliance. On the contrary, the Federal Government had repeatedly stated that it did not desire any national control of nuclear weapons and that it did not regard the acquisition of its own national nuclear weapons as a possible solution to the problem.

47. It did, however, consider it necessary to give priority to an intra-Alliance solution of the question which would take account of European security requirements, as against a world-wide agreement on non-dissemination.

In this context, the Federal Government was aware that some of its Allies thought, that the problem of priorities would not arise as long as an agreement on non-dissemination permitted a solution along the lines of the MLF or ANF or similar projects, but one could not overlook the likelihood that after the entry into force of a non-dissemination treaty, the Soviet Union would increase its resistance to any multilateral solution and thus erect a new obstacle to negotiations on an intra-Alliance solution.

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51. The German Representative then reiterated the following six points to which his Government attached great importance and, which had not been sufficiently taken into account in the two draft treaties:

- (i) the priority of an intra-Alliance solution of the nuclear problem;
- (ii) the problem of guarantees protecting the non-nuclear nations against nuclear threat and blackmail;
- (iii) the restriction of the nuclear capabilities of the nuclear powers;
- (iv) inspection and control of the observance of the treaty provisions;
- (v) an accession clause which did not harm vital national interests;
- (vi) the European security aspect of the treaty and Its various implications.

This was not an exhaustive list of problems; indeed, others such as that suggested by Mr. Cavalletti of an obligation on the part of the nuclear powers to exchange nuclear information merited careful consideration.

52. Germany did not believe in the argument sometimes advanced that the Soviets had so far shown no great interest in a non-dissemination treaty and that it might deter them further if such problems were raised. On the contrary, Soviet interest in such a treaty was perhaps even greater than that of the West, as the open societies of the Western countries were more closely bound by the provisions of such a treaty than the rigid societies of the Communist countries. Mr. Kosygin had not hesitated to emphasise the top priority which the Soviet Government attached to the non-dissemination problem in his conversations with Mr. Harriman. There was therefore no reason for the West to make additional political concessions to gain such a treaty.

53. In conclusion, the German Representative made some remarks on future procedure, in view of the Resolution DC 225 adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission, inviting the Geneva Conference to give the problem of non-dissemination priority. In view of the world-wide interest in such an agreement, it might well be necessary to discuss this subject in Geneva in the very near future.

Although the Federal Government would not object to such discussions being based upon formulated draft agreements, it insisted on the necessity of first negotiating and agreeing such draft agreements within the Alliance. While his Authorities agreed that it was primarily up to the four Delegations represented in Geneva to prepare plans for the timing and tabling of such a draft, its substance must be discussed and negotiated within the Alliance with the participation of all those allied governments having a vital interest in the problems. He was therefore grateful for the statements which had been made during the meeting that there would be an opportunity to have such a discussion and to reach agreement prior to the tabling of any draft in Geneva. His Government would consider any erosion of the Alliance, recently stated to be a potential result of a non-dissemination treaty, to be a catastrophe. It was therefore very important to follow a procedure in conformity with the principles and the spirit of the Alliance.

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63. Mr. BOYESEN (Norway) said that this critical juncture when a solution to the problems of dissemination should be of equal interest to East and West, to the United States as to the USSR, the prospect of reaching agreement on a treaty was faint, but worthy of a continued common effort. Any impression of disagreement within the NATO countries in respect of this effort would have an unfortunate effect upon public opinion, and he believed that a clear statement to the Press of common support within the Council for the principle of non-dissemination and its promotion in Geneva would be a useful clarification of Allied views.

64. There remained many unresolved problems between member nations and in these circumstances it was preferable not to establish priorities or to insist that the alternative solutions were mutually exclusive. An answer to the difficulties posed by the problem of dissemination might be found in an agreed sharing of nuclear responsibility, by some version of the MLF or ANF, or, as Norway hoped, by some new idea emerging from the deliberations of the McNamara Select Committee. In connection with the MLF, he pointed out that under its present title such a system would continue to meet adamant opposition from the Soviets, and others, and that its purpose, the sharing of nuclear responsibility, might well be served by an organization existing under an alternative name.

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67. The **NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE** said that having repeatedly stressed the importance of the question of non-dissemination both in the United Nations General Assembly and in the NATO Council, his Authorities had welcomed the Canadian and United Kingdom proposals as an effort to clarify some of the principal issues which should be constructively examined before their submission to the Geneva Conference. They believed allied consultation on this question to be all the more important since it concerned the survival of world civilisation and the character of future international relations. They did not consider it impossible to resolve the critical problem posed by the dependence of Western security on possession of the nuclear deterrent on the one hand and the desire of non-aligned nations for a guarantee of security in similar terms on the other hand. The consent of non-nuclear nations not to acquire nuclear weapons was indispensable to any agreement on non-proliferation, but would not be given unless some, of their current apprehensions were met. In the present draft treaties, the nuclear powers were obliged to refrain from giving nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powers, but not from distributing them to their own allies. But in view of the great difference in capacity between the various nuclear powers, transfer of nuclear weapons from one nuclear power to another might have a greater disruptive effect on the existing balance of power than transfer to a non-nuclear power. The Council should carefully study the observations of Cavalletti and of the German Representative regarding the lack of balance in the sacrifices to be made by nuclear and non-nuclear powers and also the recent remarks of the Canadian Foreign Minister regarding the insufficiency of one-sided commitments.
(...)

71. In conclusion, he shared the optimistic opinion of Mr. Foster regarding the coming negotiations, but suggested that the true test of Soviet sincerity might lie in its willingness to renounce such pre-conditions to agreement as concerned the MLP or ANF or developments in other parts of the world, such as Vietnam. The West should not allow its desires to reach agreement on a non-proliferation treaty to be used as a means of pressure on such issues. The Netherlands remained convinced that a solution to the problem of nuclear sharing in NATO was as essential as an agreement on non-proliferation, but recognising the value of progress wherever possible, they were opposed to establishing Priorities or to regarding the solution of one problem as a pre-condition to that of the other.

72. The **FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE** said that although France had decided at a certain date not to participate in the meetings at Geneva for reasons he considered it unnecessary to recall because they were well-known, he felt it necessary to make some remarks at the present meeting since his Government thought that consultation on this matter was desirable.

Having thanked the Representatives of the Four Powers for their frank statements, he said that France was naturally opposed to the dissemination of nuclear weapons. There was moreover a general consensus on this project, as witness the adoption of the Irish Resolution in 1961.

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92. It would be useful to refer to some of the points put forward by the German Representative. The first of these points was the question of priorities. The question had been raised of whether the treaty should be negotiated and tabled before the problem of nuclear sharing within the Alliance had been settled. The German Representative had suggested the question of nuclear sharing should be decided first. The United Kingdom Government had not renounced the possibility that if the nuclear sharing situation was settled within the Alliance, the USSR might accept the position and go forward in negotiation from that point. He wished, however, to return to the theme that a non-dissemination treaty was an urgent matter. It was not a question that concerned Europe alone, but was a world-wide problem. As Mr. Foster pointed out, if the West concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union, it might convince the Soviet Union that any subsequent nuclear agreement in the Alliance would not constitute proliferation. While the United Kingdom Government realised on the one hand that nuclear sharing should be considered, on the other hand it was very anxious to see a non-dissemination treaty tabled in the international forum. They proposed an advance on both fronts, leaving events to decide which matter was concluded first.

114. On the subject of non-proliferation, he had been deeply interested in Lord Chalfont's argument on the need to present a treaty at this session. He did not agree with Mr. Cavalletti that the session would necessarily be short, since the resolution put forward by the non-aligned countries recommended that the Geneva Conference should report to the United Nations General Assembly during its next session. It was however important to submit a treaty at an early date since it was useful to keep the Western initiative and to minimise the possible harmful effect of a specious Soviet draft.

115. It had repeatedly been stated today, and the United States fully agreed, that any draft treaty presented in Geneva must keep the Alliance together. The United States had some difficulties with both of the two drafts now before the Council, but today's discussion would provide a suitable basis on which to build a draft which would keep the Alliance together.

116. He could not share the concern of the Federal Republic regarding priorities. Every effort must be made to restrain dissemination of nuclear weapons while ensuring in parallel the protection of allied interests.

117. It was clear from the discussion that the Council believed that non-proliferation would be an important contribution to stopping the nuclear arms race. This must be brought about in a way which would not be divisive of the Alliance. The Western Powers must bear this in mind in working towards an equitable solution. Full consultation among the Allies should take place both in Geneva and in NATO, and particular attention should be paid to the views of the Federal Republic. In this connection he said that it was his intention to have almost daily contacts with Mr. Schnippenkötter.

118. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he thought it necessary, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, to interpret briefly some of the comments he had made. He was in agreement with Lord Chalfont, as regards Press arrangements, that one might indicate to the Press that there had been a consensus in the Council in favour of the principle of non-dissemination. On the question of priorities, he thought that it was not the position of his Authorities that no discussions or negotiations should take place in Geneva on non-dissemination before an agreement on NATO nuclear arrangements. The aim of his Authorities was that the signature of any non-dissimulation treaty should not precede agreement on NATO nuclear arrangements. His Authorities did not share the view that a treaty was of such over-riding importance that other points might be set aside, such as European security and German national interests. A simple text could be an advantage in negotiations, but it had no absolute value in itself and was dangerous when it was reached at the expense of other interests. As pointed out in today's discussion, India, Sweden and other countries had raised certain problems; if these were ignored in the first Western draft text, the result might be precisely what the West feared, i.e. the appearance of counter-proposals from the third side. He therefore thought it essential that even in a first draft, certain problems should be taken into account.

119. As regards procedure for consultation, he had suggested that the preparation of a final Western draft should be discussed in the Council or some other NATO body. He asked whether the absence of comment on this proposal meant that other NATO member countries had different suggestions to make and, if so, what these suggestions were. He thought that today's discussion had shown clearly that the consultation provided for in Geneva, and through the fortnightly briefings to the Council, was inadequate. For example, in the time available it had been impossible for him to go into details such as the reasons why his Government thought that a disclaimer clause was necessary.

It was therefore essential to evolve a more appropriate procedure for consultation. Secondly, the Four Western Powers did not, in his opinion, go to Geneva from this meeting armed with any sort of instructions or mandate from the rest of NATO. In his mind, this had been not a briefing meeting but an exchange of views and a consultation.

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122. (...) The Four would act at Geneva, as they had done so far, on their own responsibility. However, he knew that the Four Powers could be trusted to make no move which would endanger Atlantic cohesion and solidarity. In that spirit they would take full account of the opinions, reservations or qualifications, such as those expressed by the German and other Representatives.

123. In this respect, it seemed to him from what had been said by several delegations that there was still some doubt as to whether it was really feasible to table a non-proliferation treaty in Geneva immediately. The questions of urgency and of priority had also been raised from different points of view. He was confident that the Four Powers would keep these particular views in mind before deciding on any action; and he had personally taken note with pleasure of what Lord Chalfont had had to say on this.

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125. Fourthly, he thought that the main practical problem for the moment was to fit these general, and, he believed, generally acceptable principles into the further proceedings of the Council. To this end, he did not think the Council need contemplate holding another full discussion at any specific time. On the other hand, he thought it of the greatest importance that the Four Powers taking part in the Geneva discussions should keep in close touch with the rest of the Alliance, as recommended by Mr. Cavaletti. For this purpose, the Council already had an established procedure which he hoped would be continued and improved. Under this procedure, the Four Powers provided, in alternate weeks while the Geneva Conference was in session, written briefings one week and oral briefings the next, by a nominated representative of one of the Four. This procedure would not, of course, preclude more comprehensive discussions of the lines of the present meetings if at any time these were thought necessary. He hoped also that it would be possible for Mr. Foster, as the Western Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, to keep in touch with him and exchange information whenever necessary. All this seemed to him flexible and comprehensive enough to allow of a full degree not only of information but also of consultation and discussion in which every country might convey its own point of view. That, he believed, was what really mattered.

126. Finally, as regards Press arrangements, he recalled that he had said that the NATO spokesman would make no statement whatsoever to the Press about what had been discussed at this meeting - which was subject to the normal rules of secrecy governing Council procedures - and that delegation spokesmen would, he hoped, feel able to follow a similar line. Certainly there was general agreement on the desirability of non-proliferation according to the well-known Irish Resolution, but not on the conditions of a specific non-proliferation treaty at this time. But what concerned the Council at present was not so much a general agreement on the desirability of non-proliferation, but the readiness to table a treaty and the conditions under which the allied non-nuclear powers were ready to renounce their right to acquire nuclear weapons. To announce the first without qualifying, it with the second one might create a misleading impression of full agreement on the whole subject, which in reality did not yet exist. To detail on the contrary such conditions would mean revealing the Council discussions, thus not only infringing the Council rule of secrecy and preventing any uninhibited discussions at these meetings, but also running the risk of making the negotiations in Geneva more difficult. Much as he appreciated the point of view of Mr. Boyesen, he would prefer to keep to the rules, unless of course there was a clear Council decision to the contrary.

**VERBATIM RECORD OF THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL HELD ON 17
SEPTEMBER 1965** Excerpts

(...)

Mr, POSTER

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

I am very happy to again have the privilege of addressing this Group, and I am particularly happy to do it in the company of the new Ambassador of the United States to NATO, my old colleague, Harlan Cleveland. As you said, Mr. Chairman, we have divided amongst the four of us the major subjects which we believe the Council would be interested in and I, too, would think if the Council agrees, that it would be most useful if all four are able to present their particular subjects and then the discussion can take place about all four subjects. They are very much interrelated, perhaps that would save time. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, as you all know the United States Delegation to the Eighteen Nations Department Committee (ENDC) tabled a draft non-proliferation treaty on August 17th. It was the product of efforts by the Canadian, Italian, United Kingdom and United States Delegations. It was offered in response to suggestions by many countries that discussions on this subject would be more fruitful if the ENDC had a draft to work on.

You will remember that when the Western Four Representatives were here in July, there were two draft treaties under consideration. One was from Canada and the other from the United Kingdom. The biggest difference between them concerned the possibility of nuclear weapons being controlled by associations of states. The Canadian draft, by not dealing with the problem at all, might have permitted any number of associations controlling nuclear weapons, The UK draft seemed not to permit any. After the discussions here on these two drafts, we decided to propose a compromise - one that would permit an international Organization to acquire control of nuclear weapons but only if that would not cause an increase in the number of nuclear powers, whether national or international, beyond the present number. In other respects, the non-proliferation obligations were quite similar to those of the United States draft declaration submitted to the Soviet Union in 1963 after allied consultation.

We anticipated, as the distinguished Belgian Representative implied in his questions on September 8th, that the Soviet Union would probably reject the treaty at this session. This is, after all, a standard Soviet technique. In 1962, they rejected in much harsher terms a United States draft treaty, which,

eleven months later, became the basis for negotiation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in Moscow.

We felt that the discussion of non-proliferation could not really move forward without a draft treaty, and that initial Soviet rejection would not necessarily preclude later serious negotiation. Moreover, there had been much talk of differences within the Alliance on this subject. If the West had not produced a draft, the Soviets would have charged that the effort to achieve a treaty had been stopped by NATO. This would have given the Soviets considerable propaganda advantage in their continuing campaign against NATO nuclear defence plans.

As it turned out, when the Soviet Delegate finally addressed himself to the United States draft treaty his statement was not altogether discouraging. Ambassador Tsarapkin said that the United States draft treaty would ban, and I quote from the English version of his statement: “the direct transfer by nuclear powers of such weapons to non-nuclear states, the transfer of such weapons through military alliances to the national control of states and the creation by non-nuclear states of their own nuclear weapons”.

These prohibitions seem to us to get at the heart of the proliferation problem. The Soviet statement, therefore, means that we have made more progress toward a non-proliferation agreement than we really expected at the recent session. Tsarapkin went on, of course, to complain that the United States draft opened the door to the creation of multilateral nuclear forces. Such forces, he said, and again I quote: “would allow the Federal Republic of Germany and other non-nuclear member states of NATO access to nuclear weapons within the framework of such a force”.

In reply, my Delegation pointed out that no non-nuclear country would gain access to nuclear weapons in any multilateral force. No such country would acquire nuclear weapons, national control over nuclear weapons or the power itself to fire nuclear weapons. This is, of course, clear from the NATO nuclear defence proposals which the United States has put forward. It is clear from Articles I and II of our draft treaty; indeed, it is clear from the basic US legislation on atomic energy.

It was interesting that the Soviet Delegate seemed to be saying that, because the US draft treaty would permit a NATO multilateral force, it was inadequate, no matter what restrictions it would impose on such a force, and no matter what such a force would involve. Tsarapkin did not say anything, however, that would imply that the Select Committee proposal would be inconsistent with a non-proliferation treaty. The Polish Delegate, on the other

hand, seemed to rule even a Select Committee out by saying that there should be no change whatever with respect to any alliance arrangements for nuclear defence.

In reply, my Delegation reaffirmed its support for measures which would produce greater coherence within the Alliance. Our institution in the West, I said, and I quote: "are dynamic. They adjust to political, technological and military changes, including the deployment in the Western part of the Soviet Union of many hundreds of missiles, aimed directly at Western Germany and Western Europe. Indeed, there is no point in trying to draft a treaty which would preclude any adjustment by existing institutions to the many changes in international relations and in scientific knowledge, which will inevitably occur over the course of time".

We look forward to more detailed discussions on the non-proliferation treaty at the next session of the ENDC. In our view, the discussions at this session have been profitable, as a result of the tabling of a draft treaty. There is, however, no sign of Soviet compromise with respect to the multilateral force. At our last meeting, yesterday, the Soviet Delegate again refused to accept our draft treaty as the basis for negotiations as long as it permitted either an ANF or an MLF.

(...)

M. CAVALLETTI

Merci M. le Président.

M. le Président, comme vous avez justement remarqué au début, je voudrais surtout parler de la proposition que la Délégation italienne à Genève a récemment présentée, concernant une déclaration unilatérale de non-dissémination.

Cependant, si vous me le permettez, je voudrais aussi soumettre au Conseil quelques considérations d'ordre général sur la session de la Conférence qui vient de se terminer.

(...)

M. Fanfani, après avoir fait référence à la possible conclusion d'un traité de non-dissémination, a dit: "mais, s'il n'était pas possible d'élaborer dans un délai raisonnable un tel projet, la Délégation italienne se chargerait de faire un appel aux pays non nucléaires afin que ceux-ci prennent une initiative qui, sans porter préjudice à leur point de vue, établirait un temps d'arrêt à la possible dissémination des armes nucléaires.

On pourrait imaginer en effet, que les pays non nucléaires, notamment ceux qui sont proches de la capacité nucléaire, se mettent d'accord pour renoncer unilatéralement à ce pouvoir d'arme nucléaire pour une période de temps déterminée, étant bien entendu que si les exigences indiquées ci-dessus n'étaient pas satisfaites dans ce laps de temps, ces pays reprendraient leur liberté d'action. De cette manière, on donnerait un répit aux inquiétudes de la diffusion nucléaire, et en créerait de plus un facteur de pression et de persuasion sur les pays nucléaires en vue de les stimuler à conclure un accord général en hâtant ainsi le processus de désarmement nucléaire".

(...)

I noted with interest Lord Chalfont's remarks this morning on the German suggestion for an invitation formula. If I understood his remarks correctly his doubts refer in the first line to the question whether such a formula might be accepted in the United Nations and I am sure that my Authorities would be interested to know if it is possible to let Lord Chalfont state some of the reasons why he feels this might be so. I have been asked by my Government to make a few remarks on the subject of non-proliferation and I had the opportunity to discuss these remarks yesterday in Bonn with my friend and colleague, Mr. Schnippenkötter and I would be very grateful, Mr. Chairman, if he indeed could continue and add a few specific points to my statement. When we had our last discussion here on the problem of non-proliferation on 26th July you, Mr. Chairman, stated in your concluding summary that this subject "was more than ever of concern to the member states of the Alliance and to the Alliance as a whole". It appears to us that this statement is as true today as it was at that time and that it has even been confirmed by the course of the discussions in Geneva. My Government is still of the opinion that any further proliferation of nuclear weapons is undesirable. It entertains however certain doubts whether a general treaty as discussed at Geneva can today still be considered as an effective instrument for the prevention of a further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately we can not exclude the possibility that some states who in the first place should be bound by a treaty will not be party to such a treaty.

Nobody knows whether the example given by Red China might not be imitated by others. In any event a treaty binding only a restricted number of states opens up new problems, it created new inequalities.

In such a case there will not only be nuclear powers and non-nuclears but also non-nuclears de facto and de jure; countries which are free to acquire nuclear arms and others which are not.

In view of this aspect and in view of our doubts of the practical effectiveness of a Non-Proliferation Treaty we do at least of feel to be in a position to accord to this project the highest priority in the list of our political objectives.

(...)

Mr. Grewe

Since at its meeting of 26th July, the Council did not agree on a common position - at least none beyond a general support of the idea of non-proliferation - and since the Council neither then nor since has asked for negotiating a common position there exist only national positions of the various member countries on this question. As far as my Government is concerned Ambassador Schnippenkötter has once more explained to the Western Delegates in Geneva our views as I presented them here on 26th July. Since it appears that the results of these talks were occasionally misunderstood, since the discussions went on and since all these questions will again be raised in New York it seems to me to be necessary to outline again the main points of the present position of my Government. Some of them concern the content of a treaty, others the conditions and the time of our accession. In other words, some concern the "how" of the treaty, others the "if" and "when" of our accession.

The first two points are: Firstly, we consider it necessary that in the provisions concerning the obligations of the parties to the treaty apart from the formation of an Atlantic Nuclear Force also the formation of a possible future European Nuclear Force should be left open. We consider the American draft as an important contribution to the solution of the problem of non-proliferation in general and in particular to this specific problem and by Government has said so in public. We believe it of particular importance, and that is the point concerning the future negotiations, that the formulations of this draft should not be watered down. Furthermore, and that is the second point, we consider it necessary that the provisions on accession to the treaty should be formulated in such a way that a participation, whatever its form of the Soviet-occupied part of Germany, should not offer any means to improve its international status. It seems to us that this aspect has not been satisfactorily considered so far. We are prepared to submit and to circulate some ideas and some suggestions for formulations which would also apply to the Italian initiative and to the invitation to a possible World Disarmament Conference where the same problems arise.

Firstly before we can envisage accession to a Non-Proliferation Treaty the problem of participation of the non-nuclear powers in nuclear responsibility has to be satisfactorily solved within NATO, satisfactorily in the light of the proposals and ideas that have been discussed by the interested member states of the Alliance during the past years.

Secondly, it cannot be overlooked that there is a connection between the Soviet interest in a denuclearisation of Germany and our interest in the restoration of its political unity.

This connection should not be ignored all the more because the Soviet tactics in Geneva indicated that they do not give worldwide importance to this project but intend to make it in fact a European regional problem, and we anticipate that this may result in unavoidable consequences for us.

This, Mr. Chairman, is what I have to say and if Mr. Schnippenkötter could add a few remarks I would be grateful.

(...)

Mr. BOON (Contd)

My Authorities do not completely share the feeling of those who believe that the Non-Proliferation Treaty should not have one of the highest priorities. Quite obviously the number of nations who become, or may acquire, nuclear capabilities is on the increase and the result of a Non-Proliferation Treaty, if more and more nations have nuclear capabilities, would be quite different from what it would be before that occurred, but in the opinion of my Authorities that is an extra reason to put the highest priority on such a treaty. My German colleague being as we all know a very widely respected international law expert, has created, I believe, the terms of the *de facto* and *de jure* non-nuclear nations and that of course is a difficulty we are very well aware of that those who unilaterally or in a Non-Proliferation Treaty subscribe certain obligations, renounce rights which those, who do not subscribe to it, retain and that may cause a great deal of difficulty. This observation provides me with, I think, a suitable bridge to come to the proposal by the Italian Foreign Minister for a moratorium because it just touches on this very important aspect that in the various non proliferation drafts the renunciation of the rights of the have-nots, if I may use that word, preconceives the sacrifice of those who have. Quite obviously it is exceedingly difficult to make more than the few things contingent upon one another, but one of the advantages that appears at first sight of the Italian proposal which is definitely seen as a subsidiary proposal is that it indicates by the time limit and the limit of the number of nations necessary to make it effective, the period of this voluntary renunciation which is such a difficulty for a number of powers who will then become *de jure* non-nuclear powers instead of being *de facto* non-nuclear powers.

By indicating a time limit as I understand correctly those who sign such a declaration indicate as it were to the nuclear powers that they are willing to forego their rights for a certain period but not indefinitely and make it contingent, We are all aware that the Italian Government has already by the mouth of its Foreign Minister introduced the idea on 29th July and with this restraint which I feel we should applaud has only produced it officially at the end of the Conference in order not to confuse proceedings but make it fully effective as a matter for consultation at future meetings on disarmament, My Authorities have not had time to study completely the Italian proposal and its various methods but the fact that it already has had a good reception by the non-allied nations makes it important as a positive effort to bring forward this very difficult debate.
