

3. Summary Reports of the North Atlantic Council JUNE/OCTOBER 1955

I. PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS

1. The COUNCIL:

- (1) agreed that a single copy of the summary record of the meeting, in the language preferred by each delegation, classified "Cosmic Top Secret", should be sent to each delegation;
- (2) agreed that a single copy of the verbatim record of the meeting should be held in the office of the Executive Secretary for consultation by delegations, and that there should be no general circulation of the verbatim record.

COSMIC TOP SECRET

II. EXCHANGE OF VIEWS PRIOR TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

2. The CHAIRMAN said that he was sure he was expressing the views of the Council in welcoming the decision to hold a meeting of Foreign Ministers before the Geneva conference. He was grateful to the Foreign Ministers of France, the US and the UK for their willingness to discuss with other NATO Foreign Ministers the problems which would be examined by heads of governments at Geneva. The prestige of NATO would be considerably enhanced as a result. Further, the three powers would be able at Geneva to speak with the backing of the 15 NATO countries, and the solidarity of the NATO Alliance would be a valuable card for them to play at Geneva.

3. Mr. FOSTER DULLES (Secretary of State, United States) said that the present meeting was important because it marked a further stage in the process by which the NATO Council was becoming a forum for discussion of problems of interest to all NATO governments, and sometimes of problems with implications extending beyond the NATO area. To that extent was therefore a historic meeting, and showed that NATO was not simply a military alliance.

4. Some two months ago, he had informed the Council of the invitation sent in the name of France, the US and the UK to the USSR for a meeting of the heads of governments of the three powers with the USSR. Developments since then had been favourable; first, the invitation had been accepted; secondly, conversations between the three inviting powers, the German

Chancellor insofar as problems of direct interest to Germany were concerned, and with the Foreign Minister of the USSR, had provided a sound preparatory base for the conference; and thirdly, there had been a number of public statements which could be regarded as a kind of opening of the conference, and which had indicated a desire on the part of all participants in it to make it a success. There had also been occasion at New York and San Francisco, both in public statements and in private conversations, for all parties to the conference to state their case and present their various viewpoints. These "pleadings" had served a useful purpose, since heads of governments would be able to go to Geneva with a number of issues for discussion clearly defined.

5. He recalled the nature of the conference as envisaged by the inviting powers in the note they had sent to the USSR: that is, the inviting powers had thought in terms of discussions in two stages. The first, between heads of governments at Geneva, to be followed, if these discussions proved fruitful, by subsequent meetings of Foreign Ministers or other appropriate agencies. The inviting powers had believed that the first stage would be brief and that its purpose would be to formulate the issues to be worked on subsequently by the Foreign ministers and that no final conclusions could be expected from the meeting of heads of governments, who would attempt simply to identify problems for later study and to agree on methods and procedures by which the subsequent study could be carried on.

6. It would, however, be wrong to regard the Geneva meeting simply as an attempt to list certain problems for future discussion. The three powers hoped that a new spirit would develop at Geneva so far as relations between the East and West were concerned, a spirit which had been lacking in the past. International problems were insoluble so long as an atmosphere of distrust and hostility prevailed; once that atmosphere could be dissipated, solutions might become possible. A public statement made prior to the conference showed that there was hope that a different atmosphere might be generated at Geneva; whether it could last through the second stage, that is the Foreign Ministers' meeting, only the future would show. It was impossible to try to measure the success of the Geneva conference by ordinary yardsticks. In other words, it was not any final communiqué or press conference at the end of the conference which would be decisive. The success which his Government believed could be achieved was intangible, but real; that is, a new spirit in international relations.

7. Previous discussion had shown that there seemed to be three topics which both the West and the USSR would be prepared to discuss at Geneva:

- (a) the unification of Germany; The three powers believed that the division of Germany was a wrong which must be rectified in the near future. If it were not, serious trouble in Europe was inevitable.
- (b) European security which meant, essentially, the framework within which the unification of Germany would take place. The Western powers recognised that they could not expect the USSR to loose its grip on Eastern Germany if the only result was to advance further to the east the area covered by the forward strategy of NATO. Thus, while taking into account the forces necessary to ensure the security of the West, it was important not to appear to threaten the security of the USSR. The West were rightly convinced that their armed forces meant greater all round security, but other countries with a long history of suspicion and fear behind them did not necessarily share that conviction. While a unified Germany would be free to choose between associating itself with the West or the East, the Western powers were convinced that Germany would turn towards the West; and the plans of the three Western powers at Geneva must be based en that assumption.
- (c) Disarmament: Much thought had been devoted to this question. The three powers believed that the Soviet proposals of 10th May marked an advance of their previous attitude, but the sincerity of those proposals must be questionable since they were hedged around with political conditions, which might enable the USSR to evade indefinitely putting into effect the progressive part of their proposals. United States thinking with regard to a possible reduction of armaments was conditioned by the means through which an effective armaments control could be worked out. Mutual trust and confidence was important, but it was impossible to depend on that alone, because it was impossible to be sure whether the new attitude of the USSR was permanent or whether it represented only a respite during which its internal difficulties could be overcome with a view to more aggressive action at a later stage. Control of armaments only had validity provided the powers concerned could be sure that control was being carried out: and that was difficult in the modern conditions of a nuclear age. In other words, armaments control was not as simple as it had been some five or six years before, when the United States alone had nuclear weapons. In modern circumstances control meant that each country must be prepared to allow aliens to examine its own processes: the West must consider whether the measures of control which it wished to impose of the USSR were those which it was prepared to accept in respect of its own industries. Effective control might mean that some processes in industry become common knowledge to the whole world.

Was the West prepared, in demanding inspection of this kind in the USSR, to give the USSR equal facilities in their own countries? This was a question which needed very careful consideration.

8. There were a number of other topics which might be discussed, some of which would be proposed by the Western powers and possibly objected to by the USSR, others of which would be advocated by the USSR and opposed by the West. The topics which the West might wish to discuss, despite USSR objections, were as follows:

- (a) The position of the satellite countries: The three Western powers believed that there could be no permanent peace in Europe until countries with a long and proud record of freedom which were at present under minority rule could resume their place in the free community of nations.
- (b) International Communism: The International Communist movement was a revolutionary body with vast resources, directed from a central organization, which was carrying out its work, often underground, in almost every country. Its essential task was that of subversion; so long as this went on, friendly relations between East and West would be difficult to achieve.
- (c) The Iron Curtain: It was still almost impossible for citizens of the USSR and the satellite countries to know what the press of the free world was publishing, and therefore could have no idea of views opposed to the official Communist Party line. The West gave much space in its press to the speeches of Soviet leaders, whereas speeches of Western leaders were very seldom reported in the Soviet press. The fact that peoples behind the Iron Curtain could be and had been misled for years increased the danger of war.
- (d) The problem of prisoners of war still held in Russia: There was no doubt that many so-called prisoners of war were still held in violation of armistice undertakings. This represented a festering sore, which must be cleaned. The problem was one which might be dealt with during informal discussions rather than at a formal meeting.

9. The topics which the USSR might wish to propose for discussion, and which the three Western powers would be less willing to consider, were as follows:

- (a) War propaganda: The USSR alleged that the United States; in particular, was engaging in war propaganda. The three Western powers believed that this was an allegation put forward in the interests of Soviet propaganda: in any case, a discussion of this problem would not be in conformity with the spirit which he hoped to see developed at Geneva.

- (b) The Far East: Undeniably there were problems in connection with the Far East, but his Government did not believe that they were problems which could properly be discussed at Geneva. At present they were being examined on an ad hoc basis, a system which was working reasonably well. His Government believed that this ad hoc procedure should be continued for the time being. The USSR might propose a six-power conference to follow the Geneva conference, to consist of the four Geneva powers together with China and India. His Government doubted that such a conference would be the best way to solve the Far Eastern problem.
- (c) A world trade conference: The question of world trade was being dealt with in UNO and its agencies. In any case, the question of control of strategic goods was not really a matter of international trade properly so called, but a problem of security. If international tension were substantially reduced than it might be possible to relax control over trade in strategic goods. Until then, the controls must be maintained, in the opinion of his Government for security reasons.
- (d) A declaration of general principles: His Government felt that any declaration of this kind was likely to be couched in the usual communist-type slogans which might well serve Soviet propaganda at a later stage. His Government believed that it would be unwise for the West to associate themselves with any such declaration.

10. Finally, he did not think that any definitive answers to international problems could be expected at Geneva, but that the main purpose of the meeting should be to work out procedures for the future. At the same time, Geneva should aim not only at stating problems baldly, which would be a barren process, but at giving a new impulse by which solutions could be achieved, and indicate the lines along which Foreign Ministers could work for solutions. The three powers were going to Geneva with no hard and fast formulas. They would be undertaking no commitments. They would aim above all at a flexible approach. In conclusion, he said that his Government realised that the future development of the topics to which he had referred, particularly that of European security, was of intense interest to all NATO nations. He was convinced that they must be kept informed of what was going on and given every possibility for consultation.

11. Mr. PINAY (Minister for Foreign Affairs of France) said that his Government, like that of the United States and United Kingdom, was anxious to remain in the closest possible consultation with its NATO allies throughout the Geneva conference and subsequent negotiations, both in order to keep the members of the Alliance informed of the progress made, and to receive their views and suggestions.

The immediate task of the Geneva conference was to try to find a general basis on which detailed agreements could later be worked out by Foreign Ministers. There was no question, at Geneva, of committing the Atlantic Alliance to any line of policy. He hoped, however, to have the support of the Council for the position to be adopted by the Western Ministers. No change could be expected in Soviet policy with regard to Germany, that re-unification could only take place on a basis of neutrality, a policy of long standing recently reiterated in the Tass communique of 12th July. The Western Ministers would continue to oppose this, and to insist that Germany could only be re-unified if European security, including the security of Germany, were assured. No security was possible in Europe so long as a substantial disequilibrium of forces existed. The Western defensive system was an entirely peaceful one, built up at the cost of considerable sacrifices, and there was no question of abandoning it. Germany must be free to associate with the partners of her own choice; that was an essential principle which the three Western powers would always defend. While the West was prepared to recognise legitimate demands of the Soviet so far as their own security was involved, and to make concessions to them if necessary, the Western Ministers would insist on the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance and the Paris Treaty and would firmly oppose the idea of a neutral Germany. He hoped that the Council would support this position.

12. Mr. MACMILLAN -(United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) said that, since his US and French colleagues had dealt with the purposes and spirit with which the three Western powers were approaching the Geneva conference, he would deal with a practical problem, that is the way in which the NATO Council as a whole could help the three powers. The three powers hoped, as a result of the Geneva meeting, that there would be further meetings of Foreign Ministers to study in detail the problems discussed at Geneva, meetings which would probably start in October. The problem of vital importance to NATO was to work out a way in which three NATO powers acting, so to speak, on behalf of the other twelve, could maintain close contact and consultation with the twelve. The three powers regarded themselves as trustees of the other twelve, and firmly believed that close consultation between all NATO powers was essential, since the problems to be discussed at Geneva were of interest to all. The problem was therefore to see how consultation between the three and the twelve could be worked out both before and during the Foreign Ministers' meetings in October. It might be argued that all fifteen NATO governments should be represented at the October meeting. The objection to that was that a fifteen-power meeting would be over-large to examine questions of detail, and that the USSR would be likely to propose that the Satellite countries forming part of the Warsaw Organization should also be present at any such meeting.

13. Before the Foreign Ministers' meeting, contacts would, he thought, be easy to arrange. NATO could be kept informed of the proposed action and detailed plans of the three powers through the North Atlantic Council, whether at the level of Permanent Representatives or of Ministers. It was more difficult to see how contact could be maintained during the meeting of the Foreign Ministers. He hoped that the Council would let the three Geneva powers have their views in due course. He pointed out that in any negotiations with the USSR, a moment might arrive when amendments or concessions were under discussion. Would it be best for each NATO government to send a representative to Geneva to the Foreign Ministers' meeting so that those amendments or concessions could be examined or would it be better to use the machinery of the Permanent Council to maintain the necessary contact? He was simply putting this question before the Council and asking them to think it over and make suggestions.

14. Commenting on the problems to be discussed at the Geneva conference the CHAIRMAN noted that whatever the causes behind the recent change in Soviet policy, It was undeniable that internally the Soviet leaders were faced with difficulties, chiefly, economic, whose magnitude should not, however, be over-rated. It was probable that the Geneva conference would indicate to what extent these difficulties were forcing the Soviet leaders to seek for a real and lasting relaxation of tension which would call for concessions on their part. The conference would also indicate whether the Soviet leaders were prepared to agree that a reduction in armaments should be subject to international control with effective guarantees. Effective international control of disarmament must be the basis for any solution to the problem of a world-wide lessening of tension; equally, any security-system must be based on an agreement on progressive and balanced disarmament within a fully effective system of control.

15. The Geneva conference of heads of government, quite apart from any results it might have, should be regarded as an achievement of Western diplomacy, since in proposing it the West had gained the initiative, which had hitherto been in Soviet hands. At the same time, it should be noted that Soviet policy had also achieved some successes, as witness the Austrian State Treaty, where without making any substantial sacrifice Russia had succeeded in creating a new neutral zone in the centre of Europe. It was to be feared that the case of Austria might be quoted in the future as an example and might give rise in other parts of Europe to psychological reactions which could only benefit the Soviet bloc. Whatever reasons lay behind the Soviet policy of conciliation, great skill was being shown in its application. The Austrian State Treaty had been followed by the visit of the Soviet leaders to Belgrade, where they had had no hesitation in humiliating themselves in order to make good their past mistakes.

At the present time, repeated offers of friendship were being made to Greece; and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic had been invited to visit Moscow. All this formed part of a coherent and deeply studied policy aimed at isolating each question and sowing disunity among the West. The Western leaders had seen through this policy; and the present meeting, to be followed by the Geneva conference, confirmed their will to remain United in the face of Soviet manoeuvres. The Soviet leaders now seemed to admit that in future the main problems of tension between the free world and the communist world must be examined as a whole, and that the solution of problems affecting individual members of the NATO Alliance and the Soviet Union must be preceded by common agreement on fundamental principles.

16. In conclusion, he emphasised two points. Firstly, his Government considered that a general agreement with the Soviet Union must include an agreement on the future of the Satellite countries. Secondly, the policy of the Atlantic Alliance with regard to the reunification of Germany was clearly established. It was essential in any discussion of this question that the Soviet leaders should not be given the chance to confuse the issue, or to create disagreement in the Western world.

17. Mr. MARTINO (Foreign Minister for Italy) drew the Council's attention to the importance of presenting not only the present meeting but even more the Geneva conference to the public in a suitable light. They should take every opportunity of repeating that, without the Atlantic Pact, all Western countries might well have become Communist Satellites.

18. He then turned to these problems whose solution at the Geneva conference would contribute to easing international tension. With regard to the limitation of armaments and collective security, he felt that the Western attitude should be that the two problems were indivisible: there could be no collective security without an agreed and controlled limitation of armaments.

19. The acceptance by all the countries concerned of principles similar to these underlying the establishment of the Western European Union would make it possible to introduce a system of control applicable to all forces in Europe, whether these of the Western Community or of the Soviet bloc. He believed that the acceptance of such a system of control would be a real guarantee of collective security in Europe. In any event, he was sure that they would all agree that the mere withdrawal of Russian troops within the borders of the Soviet Union would not in itself be sufficient to enable them to accept the withdrawal of United States or United Kingdom troops from the Continent.

20. With reference to Germany, Italy had always favoured the return of a unified, free and independent Germany to the concert of Western countries. He therefore hoped that Germany could be unified as rapidly as possible en the basis of genuinely free elections.

21. While it seemed unlikely that the question of the admission of additional members to the United Nations Organization would be discussed, he wished to say that the Italian Government in general favoured all countries being admitted. Nevertheless, each application should be examined to ascertain whether the candidates satisfied the basic conditions of the Charter. As the representative of a country which had fulfilled all its obligations under the Peace Treaty and which was nevertheless still the subject of discrimination in this respect he could only state that the Italian Government reiterated its objections, to exclusion from the United Nations.

22. He hoped that the question of prisoners of war would be discussed at Geneva. He had prepared a memorandum regarding the Italian soldiers who had disappeared on the Russian front at the end of the war and of the attitude of the Soviet Union to Italian démarches. He stressed the importance of this matter for public opinion in his country and requested the three Heads of States to bear in mind the Italian request as set out in his memorandum.

23. The Italian Government did not expect any striking results from the Geneva conference, as it was doubtful of the intentions of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it was permissible to hope that they would at a later meeting be able to discuss those problems which the Geneva conference had revealed as being the main causes of tension. While certain of these problems might well be of particular interest, to single countries, there were others which affected all members of the Atlantic Alliance equally; for these, solutions would have to be found by all members in common. It was for this reason that he had some doubt regarding the procedure outlined by the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom. He did not believe that his Parliament would ratify any major decision unless Italy had been consulted in its formulation.

24. This matter was of particular importance as there appeared to be a tendency to remit the technical aspects of the control of armaments to the London Commission of the United Nations. As Italy was not a member of that organization, she would automatically be excluded from the discussions and this would have most unfortunate repercussions in his country. He recalled that the Disarmament Conference summoned by the League of Nations in 1932 had been attended by both the Soviet Union and the United States although neither were members.

There were also numerous other examples of non-member countries of the United Nations taking part in negotiations of specific matters in United Nations agencies. He therefore welcomed the statement by the Secretary of State for the United States on this matter.

25. Once the conference of Heads of Government had defined the problems and considered possible solutions, it would be necessary to ensure a complete and effective participation in the discussions by the governments of countries wishing to contribute actively to the final solution. Only in this way could they strengthen still further the principle of political collaboration which was one of the major achievements of the Atlantic Alliance.

26. Mr. Von BRENTANO (Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs) described briefly the attitude of the German people to the forth-coming conference. On 9th May, 1955, the German Federal Republic had become a member of NATO. This had contributed very considerably to strengthening and calming public opinion in his country. The vast majority of the German people clearly understood that it was only within the Atlantic Alliance that Germany could find adequate protection, and that co-operation with her Atlantic partners would give her the only chance of completing her peaceful reconstruction. Germany also understood that the Western Community was a valuable support in her efforts to achieve reunification.

27. He was most satisfied to have heard the statements made by other Ministers, from which it appeared that they also felt that the termination of the division of Germany was the fundamental problem whose solution was essential to any real relaxation of tension in Europe. He agreed that reunification could only be carried out on the basis of free elections. The attitude of the Foreign Ministers of France, United States and United Kingdom on this matter was particularly appreciated, as he had reason to believe that the Soviet Union would like to make that topic the subject of bilateral discussions between Germany and the Soviet Union.

28. He also believed it likely that the Soviet Union might try to persuade the Western powers to adopt a system of security similar to that proposed by Molotov at Berlin, which would imply the recognition for a "transition period" of two separate Germanys, both members of this system. He, however, shared the view already expressed that there could be no security without a united Germany. No system of security would be worth the name, in which two equal Germanys existed side by side, even on a temporary basis.

29. United Germany should be free to choose her partners; could not be either isolated or neutralised, but must also have the same rights and obligations as the other members within a system of security freely chosen by herself.

30. It was, of course, fully understood by the great majority of the German people that any system of security which might be set up should not diminish the strength of the existing agencies in the Western world. These agencies already offered considerable guarantees for countries, including the Soviet Union, which took no direct part in their deliberations. One of the essential tasks for the Western Statesmen at Geneva would be to make the Soviet Union understand the purely defensive nature of these agencies and the advantages they offered, even to countries which were not members. They should perhaps propose the establishment of a similar system of collective security, although outside existing agencies, open to all European countries if they wished, together with the United States and Canada. He did not, however, think it desirable to establish contractual relations between NATO or WEU and the Eastern organizations; This would be likely to weaken the Western system of defence.

31. The most recent disarmament proposals were made by the Soviet Union on 10th May, 1955; they showed that it was the aim of the Soviet Union to detach the Federal German Republic from the Western organizations and, above all, to obtain the withdrawal of United States troops from Europe. He emphasised that the Federal Government would not accept any system which weakened the bonds between the Federal Republic and its Western allies or led the latter to withdraw their troops from Federal soil. On the other hand, it was important that any guarantees offered should not involve leaving the present territorial arrangements as they were.

It was most important that the Soviet Union should understand that the question of German frontiers among the other territorial problems of Eastern Europe, was intimately bound up with a general peace settlement.

32. The Federal Republic naturally recognised the Soviet Union's legitimate concern with security, but he believed that the treaty structure in force in the West provided considerable guarantees for the Soviet Union as well. Nevertheless, they should very carefully consider what additional guarantees could be given without over-stepping the limits of their own need for protection. World opinion, and above all German public opinion, hoped that they would assist the Soviet Union to solve the problem which was doing most to cause tension in Europe: he referred to the division of Germany into two. In these circumstances, if the Soviet Union was prepared to undertake serious discussions, the West should not hesitate to offer additional guarantees.

They had to convince German public opinion that everything possible had been done to overcome the resistance of the Soviet Union to the unification of Germany. In general, constructive proposals by the West would considerably ease the Federal Chancellor's position in the forthcoming negotiations in Moscow.

33. In conclusion, he wished to emphasise how important it was that during and after the discussions public opinion in the free world should have access to full and, if possible, uniform information, in order to be able to support the Statesmen whose work would assure the peace and liberty of the world.

34. Mr. LANGE (Foreign Minister for Norway) said how glad he was that Foreign Ministers of all NATO countries had had an opportunity to exchange views on the problems which would be discussed at Geneva and later. The procedure they were following at the present meeting seemed to him to be admirable. He did not propose to go into the problems that would be examined at Geneva, and accepted the outline given by the Foreign Ministers of France, the United States and United Kingdom as their agreed attitude of the position to be taken there. If, as they hoped, a second stage developed, he thought that a maximum use should be made of the machinery of the Council in Permanent Session, which already had been tried out. Permanent Representatives had already had experiences of consultation on this kind of problem and full use should be made of them both prior to and during the Foreign Ministers' meeting in October. He urged that thought be given to speeding up the way in which the Permanent Council acted, since it might well be that quick decisions might have to be taken.

35. Mr. Spaak (Foreign Minister for Belgium) agreed with the view expressed by Mr. Lange. The procedure for consultation among all NATO powers was a powerful reinforcement of the Organization, and was a political development unprecedented in history. He agreed with Mr. Dulles that no final solutions could be expected at Geneva in view of the short time during which the meeting would last, and urged that every effort be made to prevent the public of their countries from expecting any spectacular results or final solutions to the problems with which they were faced. He also agreed with Mr. Dulles that it would be invaluable if a new spirit in East-West relationships could develop from Geneva.

With regard to the three topics which would be almost certain to be discussed at Geneva, he made the following comments:

- (a) Unification of Germany: the three powers should bear in mind two vital points:
 - (1) there should be no shadow of doubt in the public mind that the West was completely determined on German reunification: this point must be made crystal clear;
 - (2) once this had been established, it should be made clear that the reunification of Germany was not to be bought at any price -above all, nothing must be done to prevent Germany associating itself with the West if it so desired.
- (b) The Security of Europe: he felt the three powers should make it clear at Geneva that the Western concept of security had developed in the past 20 or 50 years. The West no longer believed in "Locarnos", that is, purely paper treaties without any basis of military force behind them. When treaties of that kind were denounced, nothing remained. Therefore, if any security pact were to be signed, it must have a military backing such as that provided by NATO. He was not certain that the USSR appreciated this new thinking on the part of the West, particularly since they had proposed on a number of occasions that they should enter NATO: with the object, presumably, of destroying the military basis of the Organization. This point must be made clear to the USSR. On the other hand, if the USSR proposed a Security Pact he did not think that the West should reject the idea out of hand; particularly if the Pact was to be signed between NATO as a unit and any Eastern military equivalent. Stressing the fact that NATO was a solid unit would have political and psychological value.
- (c) Disarmament: He felt it important that USSR should not be allowed to give the impression that it was they above all who were working for disarmament. They had stolen a march, very cleverly, in connection with the Austrian State Treaty, and it would be disastrous if they could now pose to the world as champions of disarmament. Further, he hoped that it would be made clear that the Russian conception that disarmament could only follow the acceptance of certain political conditions was diametrically opposed to the view of the West, that is, that political concessions should be a consequence of disarmament and not a preliminary to it.

36. He made the following points with regard to which Mr. Dullos had indicated as "controversial":

- (a) Non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries.: he thought this was a point that it was essential to stress. The concept of peaceful co-existence, which was the concept of the moment, corresponded to the realities of the modern world.

One of the principles of peaceful co-existence was not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. It might be difficult to ensure that no such interference took place, but it was important to try to do so.

- (b) The Satellite countries: he agreed that their position was tragic, in that, with a long tradition of independence behind them, the countries in question were now being ruled by minority governments. On the other hand, he did not see how it could be raised in logic, if the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries was to be stressed. Mr. Dulles's views on this point were undeniably generous, but inconsistent with his views on(a) above.
- (c) Declaration of Principles: naturally, the West did not want a declaration at the end of the conference of a communist character. On the other hand, it would be unwise to be rigidly hostile to any sort of joint declaration which would not provide fodder for future communist propaganda. There was a psychological danger in the West showing itself completely opposed to any joint declaration with the Soviet.

37. MR. ZORLU (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey) welcomed this opportunity for consultation before the Geneva conference. His Government had always considered that the essential problem of the Atlantic Alliance was to maintain a United front in its relations with the Soviet world. It had found in its recent attempt to bring about a relaxation of tension between Turkey and the USSR, that such bilateral negotiations were part of the wider problem of relations between the West and the East. For this reason he hoped that the consultations begun at this meeting would continue throughout the Geneva conference and subsequent negotiations, and that the Western Ministers would continue to show wisdom, firmness and unity. The results of the Geneva conference would be of great significance, in particular the impressions gained from it by the Russians, who would take advantage of it to detect differences of opinion among the Western powers which they might thereafter exploit. For the future he emphasised the danger for the West of undertaking commitments without serious guarantees from Russia in return. The idea was growing in Western countries that present tension was due to a series of acts on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and could accordingly be reduced by concessions on each side. It was essential that public opinion in the West should realise fully that tension was due to policies which were solely the responsibility of the Soviet rules and that no reduction in tension was possible without a sincere and fundamental change in these policies.

38. With regard to the first of the three problems to be discussed at Geneva, the future of Germany, It was essential that a plan for the reunification of Germany should leave her entire freedom to associate with the NATO defensive alliance. The plan put forward by Sir Anthony Eden seemed most calculated to achieve this.

With regard to a possible collective security system, the West must insist on the need to maintain the defensive system of the Atlantic Alliance. With regard to disarmament, any system devised must extend to all kinds of weapons, and must provide guarantees of effective control. So long as no effective control of armaments existed, it was essential to develop the military power of the Atlantic Alliance in the cause of world peace and security.

39. MR. BEYEN (Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands) said that it was most satisfactory to see how NATO was increasingly becoming an instrument of common effort in the political field. The problem of finding a procedure for the proposed consultations to follow on the Geneva conference would have been almost insoluble if the machinery of NATO had not existed. Within NATO it would be possible to find a solution which would keep all the members of the Alliance informed, while avoiding the cumbrous unworkable expedient of a conference involving a large number of powers. The present discussions, which reflected unanimous agreement on fundamental principles, showed the importance of NATO as a free society of nations, within which minor differences of opinion could be freely discussed. In conclusion, he agreed with Mr. Spaak that the problem of the position of the Soviet Satellite countries should be handled with great caution.

40. Mr. PEARSON (Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada), expressed his appreciation at the opportunity given for all NATO Foreign Ministers to meet together before the Geneva conference. He hoped that the machinery of the Permanent Representatives would be used both prior to and during the meeting of Foreign Ministers which might take place in October, since that machinery had been well tested in the past. He agreed with the Italian Foreign Minister that they were not here today to give a mandate to the three powers to act on behalf of the other twelve NATO powers, since each Foreign Minister had his responsibility to his own Parliament and his own peoples. Nor did he believe that the three Geneva powers would wish it. As he saw it, they had met to emphasise the importance of the problems to be discussed at Geneva to all of them, and to support and approve the approach which the three Geneva powers were taking to the conference, and the spirit which animated them. He thought it important that they should emphasise to the public opinion of their countries that no spectacular results could be expected from Geneva. He agreed with Mr. Dulles that it would be valuable to develop a new spirit at Geneva, but warned the Council that the USSR might make a different approach, by putting forward concrete proposals to solve certain problems, with the object of winning the initiative. From that point of view he was glad that Mr. Pinay had stressed the fact that the Geneva powers would be governed both by prudence and by imagination in their approach to the conference.

If the USSR put forward concrete proposals on the topics outlined by Mr. Dulles, then he thought their proposals should be judged in the light of the following criteria:

- (a) What would be their effect on the collective security of the West, at present guaranteed by NATO, and which might be guaranteed at a later stage through UNO? The three powers should insist that NATO was not a subject for bargaining.
- (b) What would be their effect on the deterrent strength built up by NATO and operating through the certainty of rapid and effective retaliation?
- (c) What would be their effect on the political, economic and social association of Germany with the West, assuming that Germany decided to do so?
- (d) What would be their effect on the present movement for the limitation of armaments? In this connection he had been interested to hear Mr. Dulles' remarks on the difficulties of armaments control. He believed that past assumptions with regard to armaments control, valid before the nuclear age, should be re-examined in the light of recent developments. He had also been struck by the Italian Foreign Minister's statement that certain countries had not been able to participate in disarmament talks sponsored by UNO because they were not members of UNO. That was a position which must be rectified, either by ensuring the entry of the countries concerned into UNO; or possibly by advocating the creation of a specialised UNO Agency to deal with security and disarmament: non-members of NATO could become members of specialised agencies. This was a point on which he felt the Council should reflect.

41. Finally, he pointed out that while the three Geneva powers had immediate responsibilities at the conference, all NATO powers were deeply concerned with the questions which would be discussed. He wished the three Heads of Governments good luck in their task, and said that he could fully support their approach to the problem. He hoped that all NATO countries would be consulted prior to and during any subsequent meetings of the four Foreign Ministers, if possible through the machinery of the Council in permanent session.

42. Mr. CUNHA (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal) welcomed the exchange of views which had taken place, and which emphasised the unity of the Atlantic Alliance. With regard to the three main problems to be discussed at Geneva, he agreed it was essential to ensure that Germany remained free in the future to associate herself with the West. Any collective security system to be accepted must be effective in practice, and be based on the continuance of the military strength of the Atlantic Alliance.

The question of disarmament must first be the subject of thorough technical study before it would be possible to take political decisions. As regards disarmament discussions within the United Nations, Portugal was at the same disadvantage as Italy in not being a member of the Disarmament Commission. He agreed with previous speakers that the machinery of NATO should be used for the purpose of consultations following on the Geneva conference, in order that all member countries should be fully associated with the negotiations. In conclusion, he expressed his sincere hopes for the successful outcome of the Geneva conference, both in terms of actual results and of the effect of the conference on the opinion of the free world.

25TH OCTOBER 1955

(...)

I. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN said that it was a great honour for his country and for himself to assume the chairmanship of the North Atlantic Council. He would like to take the opportunity to pay tribute to his eminent predecessors and to Lord Ismay who presided over the Council. In permanent session with great wisdom and skill. NATO was indeed fortunate to have a man like Lord Ismay at the helm.

2. The present meeting of Foreign Ministers was a symbol of the fundamental unity of the Alliance. People all over the world were now looking towards Geneva in the hope that the forthcoming negotiations would lead to great improvements in the world situation. It was very appropriate that consultations should take place in this Council in connection with the preparation for the Geneva Conference. The matters to be discussed in Geneva were of great concern to them all and it was in conformity with the NATO spirit that all should co-operate in this great effort of trying to bring about truly peaceful relations.

3. In the period of preparation before the Geneva Conference, the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, through the machinery of the North Atlantic Council in permanent session, had kept their colleagues informed of their preliminary views. The Council now had before it a new statement on the Geneva proposals. Since they had only had it for a short time, it would perhaps be necessary to provide for a meeting in the afternoon for those of his colleagues who might not be ready to discuss the paper now.

In that case the present meeting could perhaps be used to hear the views of the Geneva powers and others who were ready to discuss the matter.

4. He then consulted the Council with regard to records of the meeting. He suggested that, unless any member of the Council objected, only a summary record of the meeting should be kept, and that distribution should be limited to three copies per delegation.

5. **The COUNCIL:**

approved the Chairman's proposals with regard both to the timetable of the meeting and the records of the meeting set out above.

COSMIC TOP SECRET

**II. EXCHANGE OF VIEWS PRIOR TO THE GENEVA
CONFERENCE**

Documents: PO/55/894 SGM-761-55:

6. Mr. FOSTER DULLES (United States) said that his colleagues had agreed that he should make a presentation on the first item of the Geneva Conference: European security, and the unification of Germany. He reminded the Council that when plans for the "summit" conference had been discussed in July, the three Geneva powers had stressed the fact that two distinct stages had been contemplated:

- (a) a meeting of Heads of Governments at which it was hoped that a new and more harmonious spirit with regard to East West relationships could be developed;
- (b) a later meeting of Foreign Ministers when an attempt would be made to put the new spirit to work in an attempt to solve concrete problems.

7. The first stage was now over, and it seemed to be generally agreed that the summit meeting had led to a better spirit, that there was less brittleness in East-West relationships. The second stage was now about to open, during which the new spirit would be put to an acid test: the world would learn whether the new spirit could be applied to practical problems. To understand the problems facing Foreign Ministers at Geneva, he recalled what had happened during the July meeting. Sharp differences had become evident between East and West with regard to the way in which Germany should be re-unified. The USSR had taken the line that the reunification of Germany was hot an urgent problem, and that the first essential was to create a European security system, after which the regional security arrangements (NATO, the Brussels Treaty, and the Warsaw Pact) would gradually be phased out.

It was reasonable to assume from the Russian position that Germany would be unified at a later date, but no concrete proposal to this effect by the Russian leaders had ever been made.

8. The Western powers had consistently maintained that the security of Europe was impossible so long as Germany remained divided, both because the division of Germany was fundamentally wrong and because it was a cause of insecurity. The Western powers had therefore urged that consideration must in the first place be given to German reunification. To meet Soviet concern that their security might be jeopardised by a reunified Germany which might at a later stage adhere to NATO, the Western powers were now prepared to sign a Security Treaty as part of the framework within which German unity could be brought about. He stressed the fact that the Western powers did not regard the Security Treaty as an end desirable in itself. This issue had become acute at the end of the summit meeting, and it had required the full authority of the three Western powers to persuade the Russians that the two problems of European security and German reunification were closely interrelated and must be discussed together.

9. For the meeting in Geneva which was about to open, he thought it must be assumed on the basis of the July meeting and subsequent Russian reactions that the Russian position would probably have reverted to the line they were taking in the early stages of the July meeting: that is, that European security should be considered as an isolated issue first of all, and that the problem of German reunification should be examined at a later stage. The three Foreign Ministers at Geneva intended to push forward vigorously and constructively along the lines laid down by their Heads of Governments in Geneva: that is, that German reunification and a possible Security Treaty to guard against Russian fears must be considered simultaneously. He added that from the point of view of the three powers no Security Treaty was necessary, since their defensive requirements were covered by the North Atlantic Alliance; however, they recognised the Soviet concern for its security.

10. The Foreign Ministers proposed to submit to the Conference, as early as possible, a paper which would contain two parts:

- the so-called Eden Plan for the reunification of Germany;
- an outline of the Security Treaty they were prepared to sign once agreement had been reached on reunification.

11. He did not propose to go into details with regard to the Eden Plan, which had been public property for a considerable time, and which was set out in document PO/55/894.

However, he wished to stress the paragraph at the bottom of page 8 of that document which stated that the all-German Government, as soon as it had been formed, would have authority to assume or reject the international rights and obligations of the Federal Republic and the Soviet zone of Germany and to conclude such other international agreements as it might wish. That meant, in other words, that a reunified Germany would be free to adopt or reject international treaty agreements such as those covered in NATO or the Warsaw Pact. This seemed the only sound juridical view which could be taken of the position which would arise when Germany was reunified. There remained a theoretical risk that a reunified Germany might reject NATO and the Brussels Treaty, but the Western powers believed that this risk was more theoretical than real. He also drew the attention of the Council to the footnote appearing on page 9 of PO/55/894, stating that the provisions of the Eden Plan were subject to any provisions which might be agreed upon in a European Security Treaty. That was relevant with regard to the fact that occupation forces would remain in Germany until the conclusion of a Peace Treaty, a provision which might be modified if a Security Treaty came into force.

12. He then referred to the proposals made with regard to a Security Treaty set out on page 4 of PO/55/894. He pointed out that those proposals might have to be modified since the Soviet had not yet made known their desires in this connection. He commented briefly on the provisions outlined:

13. Preamble: As he saw it, the essential signatories to a Security Treaty would be the Western powers named in the preamble, a reunified Germany, the USSR, and the Satellite states bordering on Germany .(Poland and Czechoslovakia). Other NATO countries might adhere to the Treaty if they so desired.

14. Article 1 and Article 2: (Renunciation of the use of force, and withholding support from aggressors) were based on the Charter of the United Nations. These two articles, together with Article 6 (Consultation) might come into force once Germany had been reunified, and before the new German Government had decided whether or not it wished to become a member of NATO.

15. Article 3: He stressed the fact that the three Foreign Ministers had no rigid ideas with regard to the size of the zones referred to in this article. They felt at present that the zones should embrace the greater part of reunified Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. But they were prepared to consider Soviet views on this point. Similarly, with regard to the provisions for the maintenance of the balance in the two zones, the three Ministers were also flexible in their outlook.

Again they were flexible with regard to the last sentence of this article which suggested that in parts of the zones closest to the line of demarcation there might be special measures relating to the disposition of military forces and installations. This was to avoid the possibility of border clashes or fear on the part of the Russians that the West might set up advanced bases in Germany. He had made this point at the July meeting, but had received no reply from the USSR.

16. Article 4.: The “progressive” procedures suggested with regard to inspection and control were based on the thought that control might be started in respect of the forces in the two zones easy to control, and could be extended once experience had shown that control could work.

17. Article 5: The “overlapping” radar warning system suggested would, if accepted by the USSR, need careful advice from NATO military authorities before details could be worked out.

18. Article 6: This was a standard article in agreements of this kind.

19. Article 7: This was in conformity with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter which laid down the inherent right of nations to individual and collective self-defence. The essential purpose of the article was to enable a reunified Germany, if it so desired, to request the withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany, while maintaining United States forces in Western Germany.

20. Article 8: This, from the point of view of the United States Government, was one of the most important articles of the Treaty. It was very far-reaching. He believed the United States Congress would accept the commitment undertaken in it, but it was a considerable commitment: it guaranteed the USSR against aggression by any member of NATO. Put bluntly, it meant that the United States would fight on the side of Russia if a reunified Germany at a later stage attacked Russia. He was not sure that the United States would be ready indefinitely to offer a guarantee of this kind.

21. Article 9: This stated that the Treaty would enter into force by stages. The first stage might be entry into force of Articles 1, 2 and 6 once Germany had been reunified, but before it had taken any position with regard to entry into NATO. A second stage might be Article 8 (Obligation to react against aggression) which could only become effective once Germany had taken a decision with regard to entry into NATO. There were other articles (Inspection and control of Armaments, the special warning system etc.) which might come into effect after Stage 2 had been completed.

Here again, the Western powers held no rigid views, and were prepared to consider carefully any Soviet counter-proposals that might be made at Geneva.

22. To conclude, he believed that the maximum success that could be expected from Geneva was acceptance in principle by the USSR of the two-phase plan he had outlined, a plan which would be put into effect simultaneously. However, he was dubious whether this real measure of success could be achieved because he believed that the real concern of the Soviets in respect of reunification was not based on security considerations which could be met, but on the future of the so-called German Democratic Republic. Reunification would, he was convinced, mean the end of the GDR; and the consequences would be felt not only in East Germany but in all the puppet governments set up in the Satellite states. It was significant that, after the summit talks, the Russian Delegation had gone at once to Berlin rather than to Moscow, presumably to reassure the East German Government. Moreover, even if the two-phase plan were accepted, lengthy negotiations among experts, in which military advisers on both sides would have to participate, would be necessary. However, that was looking ahead.

23. His last point concerned representation at Geneva. The directive after the summit conference laid it down that Foreign Ministers should make such arrangements as seemed to them desirable for participation in the October meeting, in consultation with the interested parties. The two parties most directly concerned from the Western point of view were the Federal Republic of Germany and NATO. The German authorities had indicated that they would prefer not to sit at the Conference table, since that might lead to a similar request by the German Democratic Republic. They would be willing to obtain their information and indicate their views outside the Conference through the three Western powers. So far as NATO was concerned, he assured the Council that the three powers wished to maintain the closest contacts at every stage of the meeting through the Council in permanent session and, if necessary, through a meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers.

24. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) said that one point in Mr. Dulles statement had astonished and alarmed him: that was, that the proposed Security Treaty which would be signed on the Eastern side by the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and on the Western side only by the states named in the preamble to the Treaty, and that the right of other NATO states become parties to the Treaty was nowhere laid down.

25. Mr. DULLES replied that the three powers considered that the Western states named in the preamble were those indispensable to the signature of a treaty: other NATO countries could certainly become parties if they so desired.

26. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) said he was deeply concerned at this attitude. It seemed to him to be a severe blow to NATO cohesion, and would pose for the future a whole series of delicate problems and must inevitably lead to the weakening of NATO solidarity.

27. Mr. DULLES pointed out that the Brussels Treaty included some, but not all, NATO countries. He thought that the present proposals of the three powers represented an analogy with that Treaty. If the three powers suggested that all NATO countries should be signatories to the Treaty, then the USSR would probably suggest in reply that all members of the Warsaw Pact should also be parties; and this might lead to complications.

28. Mr. ZORLU (Turkey) associated himself with the views expressed by Mr. Spaak. This was the first time since the creation of NATO that the West was entering into contact with the Eastern bloc and he felt that it would be extremely unfortunate if this new relationship were confined to certain NATO countries. The feeling would quickly grow that there were two categories of states within NATO, and an opportunity to divide and weaken NATO would be given to the USSR. He did not think the analogy with the Brussels Treaty was a sound one. The whole question needed very careful study, and he suggested that the Council in permanent session might examine it.

29. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) said he wished to raise another point. He agreed with the three Foreign Ministers that the main issue at Geneva would be the question of the reunification of Germany based on free elections, after which the government elected would take its decision with regard to previous international commitments. Mr. Dulles had said that, after that, a Security Treaty would be proposed to relieve Soviet security fears. He wanted to know whether the Security Treaty would come into effect only if the reunited Germany decided to enter NATO and WEU, or whether it would be offered to the Russians whatever the government of a reunited Germany decided in this field.

30. Mr. MACMILLAN (United Kingdom)said that Mr. Spaak had laid his finger on two of the main questions of concern to the three Ministers. However, the West had continually suggested to Russia in recent years that they should withdraw from Eastern Germany, and the Russians had replied that, if they did so, reunited Germany might again become a menace to their security. The West, in turn, was now replying that, in that case, they were ready to give security guarantees against the possible threat to Russia of a reunited and re-armed Germany. The three Foreign Ministers would be only too pleased if all NATO countries became parties to the Treaty; but he pointed out that the Treaty added nothing to the security of the West, but imposed additional commitments; in brief, a Security Treaty said that if a reunited Germany attacked Russia, then the parties to the Treaty would go to the aid of Russia. With regard to Mr. Spaak's second point, he said that if a reunited Germany did not decide to continue the Federal Government's membership of NATO, then the Security Treaty would not come into force.

31. Mr. ZORLU (Turkey) thought that the other members of NATO should have an automatic right to enter the proposed Treaty, without having to seek the agreement of the Russians. On this, the first occasion on which it was proposed that the West and the East should be associated in a treaty, all the members of NATO should be equally entitled to become parties to it. He suggested that the outlined plan should be re-drafted to allow for the participation in the Treaty of such other Western and Eastern European states as might so desire.

32. Mr. DULLES (United States) pointed out that the consequence of this would be to include a number of Soviet Satellite states, whose security the United States was not prepared to guarantee. He suggested that it might be preferable to use the words: "Such other Western and Eastern European states as might be determined."

33. Mr. PINAY (France) pointed out that NATO was a defensive organization, some of whose member states might not wish to be involved in the commitments which the three Western powers were prepared to undertake. He thought, however, that some formula of association might be worked out for those other NATO members who desired to participate.

34. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) supported the point of view of Mr. Zorlu, that the present proposals would put some NATO countries on a different footing from others. This would represent en exceedingly grave danger for NATO. It would give a handle to neutralist propaganda, and the Russians would most certainly take advantage of the position to offer security treaties to the NATO countries not included in the East-West Treaty.

At a time when the unity of NATO ought to be stressed, the present proposals would simply give the Russians the advantage in their attempts to disintegrate NATO. Further, he did not see how it was possible for some NATO countries to take on new commitments without the agreement of the other countries; the repercussions of such action would present grave practical difficulties with regard to the movement of NATO forces. For these reasons, he suggested that either all the NATO countries should be party to the proposed Treaty, or preferably, NATO itself should participate, as a legal entity, in the Treaty.

35. Mr. DULLES (United States) said that the three Foreign Ministers had left open the question of the membership of other NATO countries, since it would not have been possible for them to commit other governments without prior consultation. There was no intention that other NATO countries should be excluded. If Russia was prepared to consider the Eden Plan seriously, it would then be possible for other NATO countries to say whether they wished to join the Treaty, thus assuming the additional obligation to guarantee Russia against attack.

36. Mr. LANGE (Norway) thought that the present discussion was somewhat academic, since no one knew whether the Russians would be prepared to consider the Eden Plan seriously.

He would be satisfied to leave the question as it was at present, convinced as he was that the three Foreign Ministers were fully aware that the other NATO countries did not wish to be excluded from any Security Treaty and on the understanding that, if and when the Russians agreed to negotiate, all NATO member countries would be consulted further.

37. Mr. MACMILLAN (United Kingdom), referring to the second item on the Geneva agenda, disarmament, said that there was no intention of carrying out at Geneva the work which was properly the responsibility of the United Nations Sub-Committee on Disarmament. The object was rather to use the Geneva Conference to introduce new ideas, and give a new stimulus, to the work being carried out in the United Nations. A major preoccupation was still the vital question of what effective control of nuclear weapons could be devised. In fact, the question of disarmament was in essence one of control. The West was not yet ready, in the light of recent scientific developments, to produce a nuclear control plan which would be practicable. Scientific advance was continuously outstripping plans for control. At first they had thought of control in terms of control of materials. Events had outstripped that, and they were now thinking in terms of control of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

But even here new advances in techniques of delivery might make such plans ineffectual. The problem of control of nuclear weapons remained unsolved.

38. With regard to the control of conventional weapons, there appeared to be a possibility of reducing armaments to lower levels than at present, thus easing the burden of military expenditure. However, though control in this field was easier, it must be effective; and the Russians had put forward no concrete plans for control. Meanwhile, studies were proceeding on how confidence could be built up through schemes of inspection and control; this was one of the most useful fields of study, and the development of such schemes should be continued. Progress on disarmament negotiations would depend to a great extent on the progress achieved in the field of European security and German re-unification. The most that could be expected at Geneva would be a clarification of the Russian position, and a joint four-power declaration to serve as a directive to the United Nations Sub-Committee when it resumed its work in the New Year.

39. Mr. PINAY (France) dealt with item III on the agenda of the forthcoming Geneva Conference, (East/West contacts). He reminded Ministers that last July the Heads of Government had invited their Foreign Ministers to instruct their experts to study measures which could "bring about a progressive elimination of barriers which interfere with free communications and peaceful trade between peoples, and bring about such free contacts and exchanges as are to the mutual advantage of the countries and peoples concerned". The study of these measures had been carried out and the three Foreign Ministers had considered and approved the conclusions reached. They found that it would be to the advantage of the West to adopt a positive attitude in this field of East-West contacts and particularly in regard to the free exchange of information and ideas and free movements of persons. The extension of such exchanges could make a useful contribution towards allaying mistrust and fear between nations. It was important, however, for the Western powers to keep a united front in this meeting with the Soviet Union.

40. On this condition the West could hope, through wider contacts, to exercise a favourable influence on the peoples of the Soviet Union and might even succeed in awakening tendencies on the other side of Europe which the authorities there would have difficulty in reversing. Moreover, the West would no doubt get to know the Soviet Union better through such contacts.

41. A policy of this kind also had its drawbacks, the development of East-West relations would no doubt provide the Soviet Union with additional facilities for infiltration and propaganda and new opportunities for encouraging Communist action.

The West should therefore remain on its guard and above all should not give the impression that it approved the status quo in Europe and Soviet domination of the Satellite countries.

42. Despite these drawbacks, it was important to put forward a positive programme and the most clear-cut proposals possible, for otherwise the West would run the danger of being accused by the Soviet Union of failing to fulfil the hopes expressed by the last Geneva Conference by the Heads of Government.

43. The West must continue to believe in its own cause and the Western countries had much to gain if, in presenting their cause to world opinion, they proclaimed their fidelity to their own ideas and way of life and proved that the Western countries had nothing to fear from comparison with the Communist system.

44. Furthermore, there was no certainty, in view of the probable attitude of the Soviet Union, that the next Conference would lead to satisfactory results under items I and II of the Geneva agenda. It was therefore particularly important to take the initiative on the problem of East-West relations in order to show that the West desired to achieve such positive results as were possible.

45. He drew attention to the fact that the three Western Ministers for Foreign Affairs would find themselves in the position of having to ask the Soviet Union to take certain measures which could not be matched by concessions on their side, since neither the censorship of ideas, nor the systematic jamming of broadcast programmes, nor restrictions on the movement of persons existed outside the Communist world. It rested with the Soviet Union to prove its goodwill on this point and its attitude to this question would be the yard-stick of its sincerity in expressing the desire to develop its relations with the free world.

46. The three Western Ministers also intended to put forward constructive proposals in the field of intellectual and artistic contacts: these proposals would cover travel and exchanges of experts, students and cultural and sports associations. They would lay stress on the importance which they attached to the establishment of direct air lines between the main cities of the Soviet Union and of the West. Since questions of this kind could only be broached at Geneva in general terms if an agreement of principle could be obtained, it would then rest with each country, in bilateral conversations with the Soviet Union, to work out the detailed arrangements to be subsequently introduced.

47. Turning to the question of East-West trade, he emphasised the necessity of exercising caution when approaching this field in Geneva. The Western Ministers could, however, express their desire to see an increase in mutual exchanges of goods for pacific purposes between the East and West. They would also take into consideration any Soviet proposals likely to promote the extension of such exchanges. They would also point out that the countries of the Soviet bloc had long had access in the West to a wide range of commercial activity, of which they had not availed themselves to any great extent. The economic conditions prevailing inside the Soviet world and certain political considerations had been serious obstacles in the way of movements of goods and the West felt that it had no special responsibility in the matter.

48. In conclusion, it was highly probable that the main object of the Soviet Union would be to obtain abolition of controls on strategic experts. Since these controls were enforced solely in the interests of the safety of the Western world, the three Ministers could not consider bargaining over them with the Soviet Representatives. The most they could do would be to intimate that if Moscow made substantial concessions in the field of security or disarmament, they might be able to contemplate relaxing controls to a certain extent in the future and revising the lists of prohibited commodities in a more liberal spirit. Even so it would have to be made clear that no relaxation of controls could take place except by a unilateral decision of the Western countries, taken after serious mutual consultation.

49. Mr. MARTINO (Italy) began by saying that the Italian Government approved the broad lines of the decisions taken by the three Western Powers regarding item I of the Geneva Agenda (the dual problems of Germany and Security). However, if, as was probable, the Geneva Conference did not lead to substantial progress, it would be extremely important to present these negative results to public opinion in such a way that the responsible parties were clearly identified. Again from the standpoint of public opinion, it would be necessary in his opinion to make it quite clear that the concession to the USSR of certain political and military security guarantees would not apply merely if a re-united Germany were to decide to accede to the NATO-WEU system, otherwise, the Western powers would appear, first, to acknowledge that the entry of a re-united Germany into NATO would threaten the security of the USSR, which would be tantamount to admitting that NATO, once strengthened by a re-united Germany being a member of it, would cease to be a purely defensive system, and secondly, could be accused of refusing in reality to allow a re-united Germany freely to choose its alliance.

50. In his opinion, the three powers should therefore make it clear to the Russians at Geneva:

- that they solemnly recognised the right of a re-united Germany to choose freely between participation in the NATO-WEU system, neutrality, and accession to the Warsaw Treaty;
- that they were prepared to respect whatever choice was made;

I. that true security could only rest on a balance of forces guaranteed by an effective inspection system

- that they were ready to co-operate with the Russians in studying immediately, and under each of the three assumptions, the corresponding force levels of the two blocs.

51. The adoption of this position would place the West in a most favourable psychological position. It went without saying that this attitude rested on the firm conviction that Germany, re-united on a democratic basis, could not do other-wise than choose the West, to which it naturally belonged.

52. In support of Mr. Spaak's observations, he said that the Italian Government was convinced of the necessity of preserving existing responsibilities shouldered in common by all NATO members by consenting to their accession to a Security Treaty, even if it were to entail the accession to the same treaty of Satellite countries.

53. He added that the Italian Government would agree to the adoption of a plan for the gradual concession of guarantees as the various stages were reached in the reunification of Germany.

54. It was not beyond the bounds of possibility that a collective security agreement might precede the re-unification of Germany, but on condition that the agreement fixed a date not too far distant, on which free elections would be held in Germany. Certain general undertakings, such as abstention from the use of force and from the provision of aid to the aggressor might be taken at the outset, independently of the process of German re-unification.

55. Lastly, the Italian Government considered it very important that the guarantee afforded by a possible security system should be really effective, while taking account of certain political and constitutional difficulties. With respect, in particular, to the military guarantees - and this applied to the second item on the Agenda for the Geneva Conference - the Italian Government was in favour of a general security system based on a mutually agreed and effectively supervised restrictions of armaments, that is, of a system which, like the WEU system, would be based on the indivisibility of all three aspects, security, restriction and supervision.

56. In this connection, he stressed the value of associating representatives of powers not belonging to the United Nations with the work of the Disarmament Commission. If the task of this Commission was to prepare a draft treaty applying to non-member states. It would obviously be advisable, before the Disarmament Conference, to draft a text to take account of the position of those states.

57. Turning on item III of the Geneva Agenda (East-West Exchanges), he referred to the necessity of close co-ordination between member States of the Alliance and to the statement by the Permanent Representative of Italy that certain action deemed expedient or at least inoffensive by the countries which had taken it, might, on the contrary, make an undesirable impression on the public opinion of other member countries. This pointed to the need for prior consultation in NATO, and the Italian Government wished to recommend the regular continuation of such discussions at the level of the permanent Representatives.

58. Some scepticism prevailed, and in his opinion was justified, regarding the likelihood of achieving positive results at the forthcoming Geneva Conference. If this expectation was confirmed, the Western powers must avoid the temptation of disguising the basic failure by purely artificial outward signs of a relaxation of tension. A pretence of relaxation would breed illusion in the public opinion of the Western countries which would mask the absence of real progress. The result would be a weakening of the resistance of the Western countries to the tactics of the opposite camp; this would cause countries in a marginal position to slide into the Soviet bloc as regards both their international and domestic policy. The Atlantic Alliance would be the first victim and there were already signs of a state of affairs which would have to be countered with energetic action designed to strengthen Atlantic solidarity by offsetting the "relaxation of tension policy" with a "policy of inseparability of the allied countries.

59. He thought it not impossible that the question of admission of new members into the United Nations might be raised at Geneva. He therefore drew attention to the special importance attached by the Government and the public opinion of his country to a satisfactory settlement of the question of the admission of Italy to UNO. The possible admission of any other countries before Italy would not fail to have serious consequences en Italian public opinion. If, in addition, such countries had taken up a neutral position, their admission would set a premium on neutralism and would penalise countries which, on the contrary, had taken their stand within the Western Defence Organization.

60. Mr. von BRENTANO (Germany) said that the Federal Republic was in full agreement with the principles underlying the plans drawn up by the Western powers for the Geneva Conference, in the form in which they had just been explained; in-so-far as they touched on problems connected with the German question, these plans had been worked out in close collaboration and consultation with the representatives of the Federal Government. The security proposals which were to be put before the Soviet Union at Geneva could well bring about the re-unification and freedom of Germany by peaceful means, and this in turn would mean security for Europe as a whole and an improvement in international relations.

61. Germany refused and would indeed continue to refuse to entertain the slightest doubt regarding the ultimate solution of the reunification problem. She therefore believed that it would be a mistake to start by assuming that the Geneva Conference had no real chance of success and hence to limit the discussion merely to a consideration of the tactics to be adopted in relation to the effect which the Conference might have en public opinion in the Western world as a whole and in Germany in particular. The Russians did not customarily reveal in advance any changes in policy or give warning of any possible change in the near future. In those circumstances nobody could say when they might expect a change in the Soviet attitude to Germany. Nor should they pay too much attention to the recent Russian statements which in any event were not very hopeful for any change in the Soviet attitude to Germany's problems.

62. If the Russians were to show at Geneva that they were not yet ready to alter the policy they had followed hitherto, the purpose of which was to deepen and perpetuate the division of Germany, it might nevertheless be hoped that the Western powers' proposals would at least compel them to reveal their intentions more clearly; this would indeed be one of the major tasks of the Geneva Conference. Hitherto; the Russians had succeeded in avoiding any clear or precise statement of the terms on which they would be prepared to agree to the reunification of Germany. They should therefore be faced with a situation in which they would be compelled to give an unequivocal reply on this point.

63. He believed that if the members of the Atlantic Community were to support the proposals which had just been placed before them for discussion, they would be adopting a consistent and workable policy leading to security and a reduction of tension. It was a policy rightly based on the beliefs that security could only spring from sound political foundations and that any real easing of the current antagonisms pre-supposed the elimination of the underlying causes of the present international tension.

While the German people wished most sincerely to play its part in carrying out a workable policy for reducing this tension, it was thoroughly convinced that nothing useful could be achieved unless the abnormal and extremely disturbing conditions in which it had lived during the last 10 years could be swept away. The German people therefore believed that It was no mere diplomatic artifice to maintain that European security and the reunification of Germany were one and indivisible, but a fundamental and inescapable fact.

64. This thesis would naturally have repercussions on the problem of disarmament. Disarmament in Europe was closely bound up with the problem of European security and hence with the question of the reunification of Germany.

65. His country would never cease to hope that the day would dawn when the Soviet leaders would also come to recognise that this was the only solution to the problem which would truly serve the interest of their own people and that it alone could ensure a permanent and lasting peace.

66. Mr. THEOTOKIS (Greece) re-affirmed his country's attachment to the Atlantic Alliance. His Government thought that the position adopted by the major powers with regard to the reunification of Germany could not be considered too rigid, and that it would safeguard the interests of the Western world in seeking a solution to this problem. His Government also believed that all NATO countries should in principle be parties to the Security Treaty which was to be offered to the Russians. As the Alliance had been formed to meet the threat of aggression from the Soviet Bloc, it was only natural that all members of the Alliance should be associated with a Treaty whose object was to bring about a lasting reduction of tension.

67. Nor should they exclude the possibility of bringing in other European countries which formed part of the free world; this applied particularly to Yugoslavia, whose participation in a European security system would offer such advantages that special consideration should be given to her.

68. This extension of the membership of the proposed Treaty would give the prominence it deserved to the idea that the problem of European security could not be solved on a regional or partial basis. He associated himself with those who had already pointed out to the Council that the number of countries to be associated in the Treaty was not necessarily directly related to the depth of the zone wherein armaments were to be restricted. It seemed to him that this zone should in any event not be narrower than that which had been proposed by the Standing Group. On both strategic and psychological grounds they ought to see whether it would not be advisable to propose an extension of this zone to stretch from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.

The danger that the Soviet Union might take advantage of such a proposal to stir up public opinion in favour of the complete neutralisation of this zone could be avoided if the Western powers were to adhere firmly to their position with regard to any scheme of this sort.

69. There had been some discussion as to whether the so-called Aggression clauses inserted in the Security Treaty should or should not apply automatically. For a number of reasons the Greek Government thought it preferable to avoid any automatic application. With regard to the method of consultation, the point at issue being whether to envisage a body such as the North Atlantic Council providing for permanent political consultations, or periodical meetings, the Greek Government tended to favour the second alternative as it felt that any organization set up under a Security Treaty including the Soviet Union should not be in a position to rival either in cohesion or in strength the agencies established under the North Atlantic Treaty.

70. Recalling that one result of the previous Geneva Conference had unfortunately been to persuade a large part of public opinion in the Western world that there had been a change in Soviet policy, a false impression which was bound to create a tendency towards relaxing the defence effort, he insisted that everything should be done to dissipate or prevent any recurrence of such illusions.

71. Mr. DULLES (United States) said there seemed to be some confusion on the paragraph on Consultation. He pointed out that the working paper on which the final draft before the Council had been based had stressed the fact that the consultation contemplated was in no way to be political consultation on a continuous basis, but consultation of a technical nature with regard to the supervision of forces and armaments.

72. Mr. BEYEN (Netherlands) associated himself with the views expressed by Mr. Spaak with regard to the membership of the proposed Security Treaty. If the Russians at Geneva showed no sign of accepting the Western proposals, as might well be the case, then it seemed somewhat academic to consider at the present meeting the membership of a hypothetical Security Treaty. If, however, the Russians showed some willingness to consider the Western proposal, then a new situation would arise. He believed it would be over-optimistic to think that the Russians might consider a Security Treaty favourably for security reasons alone.

The reasons why they might be prepared to meet the West were, in his opinion, two-fold:

- (a) The possibility that a reunified Germany might not join NATO. The Council was almost certainly right in feeling that Germany would not join the Warsaw Pact, but was it absolutely certain that they would remain in NATO? There was no doubt that the Russians would do their utmost to work for German neutrality.
- (b) The USSR still hoped to disrupt the NATO Alliance, and with this in mind would probe any weaknesses which might appear in the NATO -structure, weaknesses which would show themselves more openly if the public opinion of NATO countries believed that the Soviet threat was diminishing. From that point of view he thought that Mr. Spaak's argument was valid, and that anything which might seem to open a breach in the NATO Alliance was to be avoided at all costs. Mr. Macmillan's point that the Security Treaty would mean new commitments for the West and not increased security was no answer to Mr. Spaak's argument.

73. He did not believe that any solution could be found at the present meeting, and agreed with Mr. Lange that the North Atlantic Council must be consulted if the Russians showed any sign of accepting the Western proposals in principle, so that all NATO countries could say their word before any final, concrete proposals were made.

74. Mr. DULLES (United States) assured the Council that nothing would be done in Geneva which would be designed, to exclude any NATO country from the proposed Security Treaty, or to include any specific country in its apart from those named in the preamble. He was glad that a number of countries seemed to wish to become parties, but the position of the three Ministers was that the decision must be left to each individual country, and the three negotiating powers could not commit any other NATO country in advance. With regard to the suggestion that Satellite countries other than Poland and Czechoslovakia might become signatories of the Treaty, he said that the United States might be willing to pay a limited price to ensure a reunification of Germany, that is, a guarantee to the USSR and to the Eastern states bordering on Germany against attack from a reunified Germany. He did not believe that his Government would be willing to go further and to sign a general Security Treaty which would cover both the USSR and all Satellite states. In other words, when they were talking of membership of the Security Treaty, they should think in terms of membership on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

75. Mr. MACMILLAN (United Kingdom) associated himself with the views expressed by Mr. Dulles.

76. Mr. ZORLU (Turkey) recognised the force of Mr. Dulles' argument that the guarantees of the Security Treaty could not be extended further than to the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. But what he was concerned with was the possibility that not all NATO countries would be signatories of that Treaty. He thought it would have a disastrous effect on world and NATO public opinion if there were to be two categories of NATO countries, some parties to the Treaty and some not. As Mr. Spaak had said, this would simply offer a golden opportunity to the USSR to try to drive a wedge into the NATO structure. Further, it was the Russians who had first put forward the idea of a Security Treaty; what was their object? In his opinion, it was to gain time because they felt that NATO had built up a solid structure and had a certain advantage in nuclear weapons. They were, therefore, interested not in security, but in the insidious breaking down of NATO. He was extremely worried by the position taken by the three Western powers in their Memorandum, and urged once again that the whole question of the Security Treaty should be very carefully studied before any sort of decision or proposal to the Russians was made.

3 DECEMBER 1955
TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET POLICY

Report by the Chairman of the Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy

I. GENEVA

In summary, the following picture of the Soviet position emerged at Geneva:

- (a) Germany and European Security. The Soviets emphasized their support for the regime in the Eastern Zone. They bluntly indicated that they had no intention of carrying out the directive of the Heads of Government with respect of the reunification of Germany by means of free elections. Evidently convinced that time is on their side, they hold that reunification would necessarily be a slow process, and that the only method would be negotiation between the Federal Republic and the Pankow régime, which the USSR insists is a political reality to be recognised. Any reunification would have to take into account the social and economic "conquests of the workers and peasants" in the Eastern Zone, which implies that the Soviets no longer make any secret of their aim of bringing the whole of Germany under a Communist régime.

As the Soviet press chief indicated, "free elections" means for them elections held under a government of "workers and peasants". Mr. Molotov re-iterated that the USSR could never accept a unified Germany linked with NATO.

The USSR contended that European Security had priority over German reunification and that therefore, pending this reunification, the two existing Germanies should be members of the Security Pact. Mr. Molotov harped on the dangers of German militarism to European Security.

- (b) Disarmament. Although professing an interest in the prohibition of atomic weapons and the elimination of "foreign bases", consistently refuse to accept commitments for any effective system of control.

In its campaign to make political and propaganda capital out of the disarmament question, the USSR makes play with the announced reduction of its forces and of those of the Satellites, and with the giving up of the bases at Port Arthur and at Porkkala. Although the Austrian Treaty has now been ratified, Moscow has not fulfilled its treaty obligations of withdrawing Soviet troops from Hungary and Rumania.

- (c) East-West Contacts. The Geneva Conference demonstrated more clearly than was expected in some quarters that the USSR has no intention of "raising the Iron Curtain" in the sense in which this is understood in the West. On this question especially, East and West talk a different language. The USSR showed itself almost exclusively interested in eliminating the controls on strategic materials, and at improving, for its own benefit, exchanges in the scientific, technical and industrial fields.

- (d) General Aspects of the Geneva Conference. Some observers have expressed surprise at what they felt to be a sharp change in the Soviet position at the Foreign Ministers' Conference, as compared with its position at the Conference of Heads of Government. Examination of the declarations and documents shows, however, that the Soviet line was throughout more consistent than it may have appeared to be. The one exception was with respect to free elections, which on a reasonable interpretation of the directive of Heads of Government, were accepted in principle as a method of bringing about German reunification. What is certain is that at the later conference there was a change of tone and of general atmosphere.

The "Soviet smile", so much in evidence at the meeting of Heads of Government, was much less visible at the Conference of Foreign Ministers on the features of Mr. Molotov, especially after his visit to Moscow, and the stronger language which he then used has now been carried to offensive lengths in speeches made by Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev in India.

No doubt the general Soviet attitude at Geneva was prompted by the following considerations:

- (i) It is in the Soviet interest to lull, rather than to alarm, the West, and to promote friendlier relations and a détente, so long as this could be achieved by words and general declarations, without real concessions, and without moving nearer to the West for solutions the latter considers basic for "peaceful co-existence". It may be recalled that, even at the Conference of Heads of Government, the Soviet leaders immediately adopted an attitude of extreme reserve when faced by the concrete proposals en aerial inspection put forward by President Eisenhower.
- (ii) There is no doubt that Soviet leaders are well aware that a policy of détente also has a relaxing influence on public opinion in Russia as well as the Satellites, and that contacts with the West, if carried beyond a certain point, might constitute a real threat to the stability of the system. For internal reasons they may feel the need for rationing even the "relaxing of tension".
- (iii) The deliberately harsh note introduced into the discussions en Germany would serve to encourage these elements in Germany which contend that there is no possibility of advancing towards reunification along the lines of Four Power negotiations and Western alliances. In the same way, by preventing even the beginnings of real negotiation en reunification, the Soviets could preclude the threat which free elections would present to the Pankow régime, and thereby eventually to the whole system of Satellites.

II. USSR: INTERNAL SITUATION

2. The degree of stability and the important internal policies of the régime do not appear to have altered significantly in recent months. Khrushchev and Bulganin are clearly on top, and the positions of Malenkov and Molotov appear somewhat uncertain. Collective leadership seems, however, still a reality, and there is no Stalin-like build-up of any individual.

3. The agricultural programme aimed at improving the Soviet diet, has been pursued vigorously though results this year have not been impressive. Heavy industry, not consumer goods, receives primary attention, and real wages have risen little if at all this year.

4. The biggest event en the horizon is the 20th Party Congress in February. Scattered data indicate that the Sixth Five Year Plan, a leading item en the agenda, will continue the economic policies currently in effect.

III. THE BROADER PATTER OF SOVIET POLICY

5. The Soviets may have been unpleasantly surprised at Geneva at the unity of the West, enhanced by the consultations within NATO. In coming months they may show less interest in Four Power Conferences and prefer bilateral talks to keep up the conversation with the West, encouraging visits of Ministers to Moscow and visits of Soviet leaders to other capitals. The USSR may direct special attention to the member countries en the Northern and Southern flanks of NATO. With respect to non-NATO countries, the cultivation of closer relations has been directed towards Austria, Yugoslavia, Sweden, Finland and, to a certain extent, with Spain.

6. It is quite clear that Soviet policy hopes to reap advantages from a generalised atmosphere of détente, without having to yield any concessions on substantial questions. It is satisfied with the present status quo in Europe in the expectation that time will change the situation to its advantage. At Geneva, the Soviet leaders probably reached the conviction that they need have no fear of preventive war and that there was little or no risk of a surprise attack by thermo-nuclear weapons being directed against them. This confidence and their own series of atomic tests (including "the most powerful...yet carried out") may confirm them in their Marxist-Leninist belief that while consolidating and increasing their scientific, technological and industrial power, they can await the inevitable "crisis of capitalism", maintain a holding operation in Europe, and intensify their efforts and initiatives in the Middle East and in Asia.

7. Holding, and being held in Europe, the USSR has recently made, and is likely to continue to make more spectacular moves in Asia and the Middle East. This is a strategy which is favoured by present circumstances is also in line with Marxist-Leninist doctrine regarding the rôle of the so-called "colonial" peoples in the overthrow of capitalism. It is a basic tenet that the combined effect of increased political independence and industrial development in these areas will undermine the political and economic potential of the West. The Soviet leaders wish to encourage "neutrality" policies there and to bring more countries to adopt this line, but they also

hope to increase their contacts with the countries which follow neutralist policies as a means of extending Soviet influence there and of eventually bringing them within the Soviet orbit. For this purpose they make use, often indirectly through the Satellites and China, of offers of arms (Afghanistan, Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Syria and possibly Lebanon); of industrial, technical and financial assistance; and of commercial and cultural exchanges. The tactics are adjusted to each particular case, and the offers made are often of a spectacular nature calculated to make a dramatic impression on public opinion (the High Dam on the Nile, the Indian Steel mill, the street-paving in Kabul). The approach plays, sometimes crudely, on Arab and Asian resentment against the West; on the "anti-imperialist" theme; on Arab hostility to Israel, on the rôle of Russia as a "peaceful" power willing to outlaw atomic warfare; and on Russia as an Asiatic power which has successfully industrialised herself by her own efforts, which is raising its standard of living without Western help, and which is in friendly, brotherly fashion eager to help others to do so. The visit to India of Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Krushchev is perhaps the most important move of recent Soviet policy in this field. Coming so soon after the Geneva Conference, it illustrates the flexibility of Soviet tactics and the global conceptions on which they are based. The Soviet offers of aid are sometimes linked with attractive schemes of auto-financing based, for example, on the Egyptian cotton crop (linked with the High Dam on the Nile), and Burmese rice. It is as yet too early to judge how far the Soviet offers will be substantiated, or the full extent to which the Russians will be able and prepared to meet the expectations of the many countries concerned. Can they really offer to the under-developed countries industrial equipment, products and technical assistance, equal or even better than the West, and on more favourable financial terms? But even if Russian performance falls far short of their premises, it is clear that the USSR will derive some significant political and propaganda advantages from its tactics. It may well be that the supreme question in Asia and the Middle East will be: Can the former "colonial" and under-developed areas which have now reached political independence, build up their industries and raise their standard of life without following the pattern of Communist rule and practices?

(Signed)
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